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ARTICLES
Privative Copyright
Shyamkrishna Balganesh*
“Privative” copyright claims are infringement actions brought by
authors for the unauthorized public dissemination of works that are private,
unpublished, and revelatory of the author’s personal identity. Driven by
considerations of authorial autonomy, dignity, and personality rather than
monetary value, these claims are almost as old as Anglo-American copyright
law itself. Yet modern thinking has attempted to undermine their place within
copyright law and sought to move them into the domain of privacy law. This
Article challenges the dominant view and argues that privative copyright
claims form a legitimate part of the copyright landscape. It shows how privative
copyright claims derive from considerations that are genuinely authorial and
seek to redress a form of harm that is unique to the nature of the work involved—
a harm best described as “disseminative.” Tracing the historic evolution of
privative copyright claims in Anglo-American copyright law, it develops a
theoretical basis for understanding the workings of these claims and offers a
framework for courts to deploy in adjudicating them, which addresses the
*
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concerns about free speech and censorship that have contributed to the ignominy
that privative copyright claims continue to encounter in modern copyright
jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
U.S. copyright law is justified today in exclusively utilitarian
terms. Drawing from the constitutional directive that copyright exists
to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”1 courts, scholars,
and legislators identify copyright’s primary purpose as the inducement
of creativity. According to this theory, which has in recent times
assumed an overt economic orientation, copyright’s promise of limited
market exclusivity over original expression functions as an ex ante

1.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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incentive for the production of such expression.2 By promising authors
a set of marketable exclusive rights in their works, copyright is believed
to incentivize the production of works of authorship. Copyright’s very
raison d’être is therefore seen to lie in its role as a market-based
incentive for creative production.3
Yet in practice, copyright does much more than just induce
creativity through the market. Ever since its origins, copyright law has
seen a robust set of infringement claims being brought that have no
connection whatsoever to the market. These are not just infringement
claims that lack a market basis owing to the creator’s unique
circumstances; they are instead claims that are motivated by decidedly
nonmarket considerations. Rather than seeking to curb competition for
the production and dissemination of the work, these claims are brought
by authors and are driven by the desire to prevent any distribution of
the work because of the noneconomic harm that such dissemination is
likely to cause them. These claims are best described as “privative”
claims since they involve the author seeking to legitimately suppress
the publication of expression that is her own creation.
Paradigmatic of privative copyright claims are actions brought
to prevent the public distribution of work consisting of content that its
author does not want revealed publicly and that, on its face, discloses
its author’s identity. In these situations, the publication (or
distribution) compels the author to publicly accept authorship of the
work against her own will. In so doing, it produces a form of dignitary
harm that melds considerations of privacy, personality, and autonomy.
The earliest privative copyright claims arose in relation to
private letters, which copyright law came to treat as protectable literary
works.4 Implicit in this early treatment was the recognition that while
letters did contain literary expression, the rationale for affording them
protection was nevertheless different. These private letters entailed
their authors recording private and potentially embarrassing content,
all of which could be readily associated with them, and which the

2.
For scholarly work either pushing this idea or assuming its centrality to copyright law,
see WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 13 (2003); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1576–81 (2009); William. W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1702 (1988); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s IncentivesAccess Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1996); and Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public
Goods Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 643 (2007).
3.
Cf. Stewart Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1198
(1996) (arguing that the justification is more rhetorical than real).
4.
See discussion infra Section III.A (discussing privative copyright claims under early
English law).
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authors fully intended to keep out of public circulation.5 From there, the
idea expanded to cover other—similarly private—works. Ironically,
despite this expansion, copyright law has never carved out a special
place or category for such works within its overall skein, so they
continue to be analyzed and theorized using copyright law’s traditional
principles and assumptions.
A recent use of copyright law to address the issue of revenge
pornography illustrates this expansion in a modern context.6 The
Plaintiff in the case had taken intimate photographs of herself and
shared them with the Defendant, her boyfriend at the time.7 When their
relationship soured, the Defendant began publicly distributing those
photographs—without her consent—in an effort to humiliate her.8 The
work thus embodied sensitive content and simultaneously risked
revealing the identity of its subject and creator. The Plaintiff thereafter
promptly registered the work and commenced an action against the
Defendant for copyright infringement, which culminated in her
obtaining a permanent injunction enjoining the distribution of the
images as well as a large damages award.9 As should be obvious,
copyright’s market rationale played no role in the Plaintiff’s creation of
the work nor in her infringement claim. Instead, the claim was driven
by distinctively noneconomic considerations. Commentary and
coverage examining the case have uniformly agreed with the outcome,
but nevertheless doubted the suitability of employing copyright to this
end.10 The rationale for the supposed mismatch originates in the view
that copyright law ought to be invoked only when the creative incentive
(and its connected market attributes) is at issue, and not otherwise.

5.
For an early and insightful treatment of the idea, arguing that copyright should recognize
a role for privacy interests, see Jon O. Newman, Copyright Law and the Protection of Privacy, 12
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 459, 466–67 (1988).
6.
See Doe v. Elam, No. 2:14-cv-09788-PSG-SS (C.D. Cal., Apr. 4, 2018), ECF No. 139-1
(granting default judgment against Defendant).
7.
Id. at 2.
8.
Id.
9.
Id. at 6–9.
10. For coverage of the case, see Christine Hauser, $6.4 Million Judgment in Revenge Porn
Case is Among Largest Ever, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/04/11/us/revenge-porn-california.html [https://perma.cc/S6KZ-UMRH]; Max Jaeger, The
Ingenious Way Revenge Porn Victims are Fighting Back, N.Y. POST (Apr. 11, 2018, 9:25 PM),
https://nypost.com/2018/04/11/the-ingenious-way-revenge-porn-victims-are-fighting-back/
[https://perma.cc/B5ZC-V3KF]; Sara Ashley O’Brien, Woman Awarded $6.45 Million in Revenge
Porn Case, CNN (Apr. 9, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/04/09/technology/revengeporn-judgment/index.html [https://perma.cc/QQ4Q-LJWC]. As an example of this skepticism, see
Erica Fink, To Fight Revenge Porn, I Had to Copyright My Breasts, CNN (Apr. 26, 2015, 1:32 PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2015/04/26/technology/copyright-boobs-revenge-porn/index.html
[https://perma.cc/3NUN-4DP8] (describing the use of copyright as an “extreme” and “creative”
solution, while mischaracterizing the very subject matter of copyright protection).
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This perceived mismatch arises from a myopic understanding of
copyright law and its normative ideals. Contrary to common wisdom,
the use of copyright in revenge pornography cases is but a modern
addition to the (implicit) category of privative copyright claims.
Protecting the author’s dignitary interest and the underlying
commitment to authorial autonomy that motivates these claims have
remained important normative goals of copyright law despite the
multiple doctrinal variations and updates that the law has gone
through over the last three centuries. Publication, which had long been
seen as copyright’s principal analytical device for protection, is
routinely conceived of in entirely commercial terms. This exclusive
focus on the commercial aspects of publication ignores the complex set
of noneconomic factors that motivate an individual’s decision of
whether, when, and how to embrace the identity and title of “author”—
a decision that lies at the root of privative copyright claims.
Affording authors a mechanism of private redress for
interferences with their authorial autonomy has always been central to
copyright doctrine. And yet, modern American copyright thinking
exhibits a marked reluctance to acknowledge this as a legitimate goal
for copyright law, preferring instead to relegate all noneconomic
interests to the domain of moral rights. Generally speaking, AngloAmerican authorial interests are today classified into two broad
categories—known as the “dualist” model of copyright.11 On the one
hand are the creator’s economic interests, believed to be protected
entirely by copyright’s set of marketable exclusive rights.12 And on the
other are the creator’s authorial interests, served by inalienable “moral”
rights—rights that are taken to protect the creator’s reputational
interests as manifested in the work.13 Not only are these two categories
treated as mutually exclusive, but they are also considered exhaustive
of the kinds of interests involved. In other words, the category of moral

11. See Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in
United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 21–23 (1994)
(describing the development of the dualist theory, notable proponents of the theory, and its basis
in the French Copyright Act of 1957); Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The Conceptual Transformation of
Moral Rights, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 74 (2007) (describing the dualist theory and the differences
between it and monist approaches). As Rigamonti argues, the distinction is hardly watertight and
most jurisdictions exhibit some overlap in practice. Rigamonti, supra, at 75–77.
12. Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 99.
13. See Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 355 (2006)
(describing the moral rights theory of copyright protection as recognizing that authors have
“inalienable rights in their works that protect their moral or personal interests”); Martin A.
Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV.
L. REV. 554, 557 (1940) (discussing and exemplifying the differences in economic and moral
protections in copyright law).
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rights is routinely treated as the exclusive (if not principal) basis for
protecting the creator’s noneconomic interests.
As understood by U.S. law today, moral rights do little to protect
the interests involved in privative claims.14 They protect authors
against harmful mutilations of the work and wrongful attributions of
authorship. To the extent that they serve the reputational interests of
authors, they only ever do so for the author’s reputational interests as
embodied in the work, and never independently.15 While the interests
at issue in privative claims emanate from the distribution and display
of the work, those interests are hardly embodied within the work itself.
The work is instead the principal means through which the expressive
harm is inflicted; yet the harm manifests itself well beyond the four
corners of the work.
What justifies the persistence of privative claims within
copyright is the reality that the root of these claims is in an important
sense authorial, despite implicating other concerns. The work involved
in a privative claim very much originates with the creator and assumes
a uniquely personal status to its creator owing to its content, which is
subjectively personal to the author. The content of the work comes to be
indelibly tied up with the identity of its creator in a way that renders it
impossible to extricate the two in dealing with the work. Disseminating
the work against its creator’s wishes therefore amounts to a denial of
authorial autonomy, not just as an infraction of authorial control over
the work, but additionally in the sense of compelling its creator to
accept a set of responsibilities and consequences, as author, against her
will. And unlike with moral rights, the interference with the author’s
autonomy occurs not through any harm to the work, but quite
distinctively instead through the work. Safeguarding the author’s right
to exclude others from the work is therefore the essence of privative
claims.
Appreciating the significance of privative copyright claims
necessitates recognizing that in its most basic form, copyright law
functions by rendering forms of expressive harm (that is, harm arising
from acts of expression) privately actionable. The primary form of
expressive harm that copyright ordinarily centers around is

14. Limited moral rights are today codified in the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
As discussed later, moral rights protection remains more expansive in civil law countries, where
aspects of privative claims would find protection under the right of disclosure. See discussion infra
Section II.C.
15. The legislative history accompanying the enactment of the U.S. moral rights law makes
this abundantly clear. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6925 (noting that protection is limited to “artistic or professional honor or reputation of the
individual as embodied in the work that is protected” (emphasis added)).
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appropriative in nature—from instances of copying. Privative copyright
claims have little to do with appropriative harm. The expressive harm
at issue emerges instead from the mere dissemination or use of the
protected work without the creator’s authorization, regardless of the
objective utility or value of such actions. In this respect, it closely
resembles other privative causes of action such as defamation, false
light, and disparagement. And much like these other causes of action,
privative copyright claims implicate free speech and First Amendment
concerns directly.16 Unlike appropriative copyright claims, which
implicate free speech concerns tangentially, privative copyright claims
are by their very nature speech-impeding since their primary focus is
on curbing the dissemination of protected expression, regardless of its
market effects. Consequently, balancing these claims against freespeech considerations becomes essential not just to safeguard speech,
but also to ensure fuller recognition and legitimacy of privative
copyright claims, which are today relegated to the shadows of the
copyright system.
This Article develops a theoretical framework to understand and
analyze the working of privative copyright claims, which it argues
remain an undeniable feature of the copyright landscape. It shows how,
contrary to common wisdom, these claims are as old as copyright law
itself and reveal the existence of a hitherto unappreciated source of
normative pluralism within the copyright system. Drawing on the
working of noncopyright privative claims, it then develops a mechanism
for courts to differentiate legitimate privative copyright claims from
mere attempts at censorship.
Part I unpacks the basis of privative copyright claims. First,
Section I.A examines how they seek to redress a particular form of
copyright harm known as disseminative harm. Section I.B then
analyzes the principal nature of harm that such claims involve, showing
how they meld considerations of privacy, personality, and autonomy; it
also traces the justificatory logic of such claims to the German
philosopher Immanuel Kant. Part II then addresses the distinction
between privative copyright claims and privacy claims. Section II.A
first examines the principal arguments made in favor of using privacy
torts to cover the interests at issue in privative copyright claims and
demonstrates their flaws; Section II.B then examines the reasoning of
the famous Warren and Brandeis article that formed the basis of the
modern law of privacy to show how it misunderstood the working of
16. See Joel D. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1359–64 (1975) (analyzing the complexities
of defamation law and free speech implications).
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privative copyright claims; Section II.C concludes the Part by showing
how privative copyright claims might be understood as simulating the
working of a lesser-known moral right—the right of disclosure. Part III
examines the evolution of privative copyright claims over time—first in
early English law, then in early and nineteenth century American law,
and finally under modern American copyright law. Finally, Part IV
looks at the conflict between privative copyright claims and First
Amendment concerns and develops a mechanism for courts to use in
balancing the two while adjudicating these claims.
I. THE BASIS FOR THE PRIVATIVE COPYRIGHT CLAIM
The theory of creator incentives dominates U.S. copyright
thinking today. A product of neoclassical economic thinking, this theory
posits that creators or authors are rational actors who produce original
expression based on the law’s promise of limited market exclusivity for
such expression, once brought into existence.17 Market exclusivity—
produced through a prohibition on copying—is thus presumed to induce
creative authorship and is seen as the principal justification for the very
existence of copyright.18
Despite its ubiquity and general acceptance, the incentives
account of copyright law is hardly free of problems. To begin with, its
universality remains dubious given that it is hardly premised on any
empirical validation.19 Second, long-standing copyright law principles
and doctrine have little connection to the incentives account, a rather
anomalous situation.20 Despite recurrent calls to reform the system to
reflect this putative alignment, copyright law has consistently rejected
such modifications. And third, the incentives account readily presumes
that the work at issue—the author’s original expression that is the
subject of protection—is little more than a marketable commodity to
that author. In other words, authorship is taken to be copyright’s
mechanism for rent-seeking.
Ever since its early days, Anglo-American copyright law has
recognized a set of claims that have little connection to the logic of the
market or creator incentives. In numerous situations, creators of
original works of expression seek to have the work taken out of public
17. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2, at 13; Balganesh, supra note 2, at 1576–81; Yoo, supra
note 2, at 643.
18. See Yoo, supra note 2, at 648.
19. See Diane Leenheer Zimmermann, Copyright as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?,
12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29, 30–34, 42–48 (2011).
20. See Balganesh, supra note 2, at 1581–89 (identifying the mismatch between copyright
doctrine and the theory of creator incentives).
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circulation when it is published or distributed without their consent.
Their rationale for doing so has little to do with the market and is
instead intricately connected to the nature and content of the work at
issue, which for subjective reasons the author prefers to keep private.
These claims are best described as “privative” copyright claims since
they emanate from a distinctively expurgatory motivation—that is,
they seek to prevent or redress the public dissemination of the work and
are thus privational in structure. Copyright’s standard logic of economic
value, market harm, and authorial incentives is far removed from these
claims, which it has a hard time accounting for. This Part sets out the
working of privative copyright claims and offers a justification for them.
A. Disseminative Harm
An indisputable reality of copyright law ever since its origins has
been its structure as a private law claim. While often characterized as
a form of “property,” in reality, copyright operates by granting creators
(and owners) a private cause of action for certain kinds of unauthorized
uses of their creative works.21 The core of copyright therefore lies in its
active delegation of authority to creators for them to determine whether
or when to commence an action for infringement, even when an
unauthorized interference occurs. The decision about whether to
commence an action for infringement is therefore entirely dependent on
the creator-plaintiff’s rational motivations for the action.22 In essence,
then, copyright functions as a form of civil redress.
Despite its structure as a form of redress, the precise forms of
harm that an action for copyright infringement is directed at remain
multifarious. Owing to their focus on creative expression and the
unauthorized use of such expression, actions for copyright
infringement—as a class—aim to redress a form of harm within the
broad category of “expressive harm,” or harm from expression. Here,
copyright law is but one of several other types of private actions (some
also privative) that are directed at expressive harm, such as
defamation, false light, public disclosure of private facts, and false
advertising. The specific type of expressive harm that copyright law
aims to redress—best described as “copyright harm”—is also capable of
being understood in different ways.

21. For a fuller elaboration of this idea and copyright’s normative structure as a private law
institution, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1664 (2012).
22. For a general account of the rational motivation to commence a private law enforcement
action, see SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE 22–23 (2010).
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The first, and most common, form of copyright harm emanates
from acts of unauthorized copying and is best described as
“appropriative harm.” Here, the harm ensues from the wrongful
appropriation by the defendant of the plaintiff’s protected expression,
which in turn produces either economic or noneconomic harm to the
plaintiff. The economic harm is principally substitutionary in nature in
that it interferes with the market for the original work and dissipates
the creator’s revenue therein,23 while the noneconomic harm is
associated with the idea that the appropriation is interfering with the
creator’s ability to speak and is acting as a form of compelled speech.24
Since the right to prevent unauthorized copying is often seen as
copyright’s core—or gatekeeper—right, this form of harm is copyright’s
most basic form of harm and is commonly (though mistakenly) taken to
exhaust the category of copyright harm.
A second form of copyright harm that the U.S. copyright system
has recognized since 1990 originates in its limited recognition of moral
rights protection in the form of the rights of integrity and attribution.25
A common feature of both rights is that they derive from the need to
protect the author’s reputation.26 In essence, therefore, they are
directed at reputational harm. Yet the reputational harm is fairly
unique in that it is limited to the author’s reputation as manifested in
the work. The integrity right focuses on protecting against a mutilation
or distortion of the work in the recognition that this would impact the
authorial reputation directly.27 The attribution right focuses on
ensuring that a work is not wrongly attributed to the author, and that
the right work is accurately attributed to the author, again with the
recognition that attributions contrary to the author’s actions and intent
do harm to authorial reputation. And again, the principal focus of the

23. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related
Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317, 332 (2005) (noting that “value to consumers depends on the extent
to which a work has close market substitutes”); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product
Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 217–18 (2004) (describing how the value of a copyright
decreases as near substitutes enter the market).
24. The leading account here is by Abraham Drassinower. ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S
WRONG WITH COPYING? 111–44 (2015). Drassinower’s account is based on a Kantian theory of
copyright, under which copyright seeks to protect the work in its capacity as a speech act rather
than as an independent object. See id. at 112. For a review and critique, see Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, The Immanent Rationality of Copyright Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1047 (2017).
25. See Visual Artist Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
26. For a normative analysis of moral rights, identifying their purpose as protecting the
creator against “reputational externalities,” see Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and
Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 104
(1997).
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3).
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attribution is through the work.28 This form of harm is therefore best
characterized as “in situ reputational harm” and, while noneconomic in
character, it is nevertheless circumscribed by the need for the harm to
emanate from an action to the work at issue and not independently.
It is, however, a third category of often ignored copyright harm
that forms the basis of privative copyright claims. This is the harm that
inures to the creator from the dissemination of the work without the
author’s consent or authorization. Ordinarily, discussions of
unauthorized disseminations focus on the unauthorized distribution of
unauthorized copies, and the resulting harm from such distribution is
taken to be duplicative of the appropriative harm previously
described.29 To the limited extent that it is seen as analytically distinct,
however, it is taken to be a form of economic harm, ensuing from the
substitutionary effect of the unauthorized distribution on the market
for the author’s original (that is, authorized) copies of the work. The
harm from distribution is therefore usually seen as parasitic on
appropriative harm or limited to its economic consequences.
An unauthorized dissemination can, however, do much more
damage than just economic harm. In some situations, the dissemination
is harmful not for its economic effects, but instead because of its
interference with an author’s unique dignitary interest. Understanding
how this dignitary interest emerges sheds light on the nature of
disseminative harm.
In various situations, individuals produce original expression
that they intend to either keep private or limit to very particular
recipients. This is often, though not exclusively, in the nature of private
communications. And when fixed in a medium of expression, such
communications become eligible for copyright protection.30 Given the
private nature of such expression, individuals routinely inject into it
aspects of their persona and individuality that they would almost
28. The attribution right has both a positive and a negative component. Hansmann &
Santilli, supra note 26, at 130. The positive component entitles the author to be affirmatively
named as the author of a work that she has created, while the negative component entitles the
author to not be named as the author of a work that she did not author. Id. The negative component
can therefore obviously be disaggregated from the author’s work itself, strictly speaking, and is
therefore not operational through the work in the sense that the positive aspect is. Yet, it too
operates through the work—albeit the misattributed work—insofar as it focuses on the connection
(or put more precisely, the lack of connection) between author and work and thus may be
accurately described as also protecting an interest of the author in the work: the interest not to be
misidentified as author of the work.
29. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012) (giving copyright owners exclusive rights to distribute copies
or authorize others to do so).
30. See § 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.”).
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certainly refrain from revealing publicly. One might even put the point
more strongly: it is indeed the private nature of the expression that
induces its personality-infused content. When such expression is made
public—after its production—it amounts to a direct infraction of its
creator’s personal autonomy. Importantly, though, this infraction is
two-layered. At its simplest, it repudiates the creator’s choice to control
whether, how, and when the work is to be shared. Yet it also entails
more than that, given the nature of the work involved. Publishing the
work, or disseminating it publicly, forces the creator to admit to being
the author of the work, since elements of the creator’s persona and
identity are often apparent on the face of the work.31 The publication
thus forces authorship on the creator, with all its social, legal, and
moral implications.32
The interest at the root of this scenario is thus a complex
combination of elements of privacy, personality, and personal
autonomy, best described as a “dignitary interest.” Most importantly
though, the form of harm that its violation entails is in turn best
described as “disseminative,” since it emanates from the mere
circulation of the work without consent, tout court. Privative copyright
claims attempt to redress disseminative harm.
Central to disseminative harm is the recognition that the work
is personal to its author in a rather distinctive way, which inflects the
nature of the author’s autonomy at issue. The term “personal” may be
used to exemplify a variety of different connections to the work, and
thus requires some additional elaboration. An overwhelming number of
privative copyright claims involve work wherein the individual author
has presented herself in a particular way through the expression. Not
only is the author’s identity readily apparent from the work, but
additional aspects of the author’s individual persona are manifested in
the original expression. Personal letters, selfies, diaries, intimate
photographs, and videos—expressive work that is commonly the subject
of privative claims—typify this manifestation, though it may occur in
other, less direct ways as well. The work is therefore quite genuinely a
work of authorship in that there is a salient causal connection between
the creator and the expression at issue,33 but the particular content
imbues that authorship with a subjectively personal dimension. This
personal dimension has the effect of altering the nature of the author’s
31. IMMANUEL KANT, On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books, in
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 27, 29–35 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge 1996) (1785)
[hereinafter KANT 1785].
32. See id.
33. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Causing Copyright, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10, 11–27
(2017) (setting forth a theory of “authorial causation”).
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work remaining unpublished.36 The 1976 Act eliminated this
requirement and in its explication of the author’s exclusive rights,
replaced the idea of publication with public “distribut[ion].”37 Instead of
offering a clear definition of distribution, the Act merely defined
“publication” in terms of distribution, which it then exemplified through
specific forms.38 Simultaneously, it also abrogated almost all common
law copyright for works that it covered, such as unpublished works,
which became eligible for statutory protection.39 Additionally, authors
of works were for the first time also given a new exclusive right—the
display right—which allowed them to control the public display of the
work, of particular importance to works that could not be disseminated
except in their original, such as pictorial works and sculptures.40
Consequently, unpublished works came to obtain copyright
protection—including under the distribution and display rights—as
long as they met the statute’s other criteria for protectability. By
allowing unpublished works to be the subject of both distribution and
display right claims (under § 106(3) and § 106(5) of the statute),
copyright law today allows privative claims to be brought for both
published and unpublished works without exception—though, of
course, the nature of the disseminative harm and interest remain
significantly stronger for the latter.41 This is certainly not to suggest
that copyright infringement claims for the unauthorized dissemination
of unpublished works are always privative claims; just that they can be,
a reality that is often ignored.
Discussions of copyright’s distribution and display rights focus
on the economic harm that arises from unauthorized distribution or
display of the work, principally in terms of its market effects. They
ignore the simple reality that these rights are just as important for
redressing noneconomic disseminative harm. The distribution and
display rights, as they stand today and in the myriad forms that they
36. Id.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
39. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.01 (2018)
(discussing the 1976 Act’s “virtual abolition” of copyright protection under the common law by
federal preemption).
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(5).
41. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 39, at § 4.01[A]. This is not to imply that other
rights—such as the reproduction right, see 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), the public performance right, see 17
U.S.C. § 106(4), or the derivative works right, see 17 U.S.C. § 106(2)—are never implicated in
privative copyright claims. To the contrary, they routinely are, especially given that plaintiffs have
little to lose by pleading additional rights. It is just that the distribution right and the public
display right most directly implicate the nature of concerns involved in disseminative harm, which
relate to the public revelation of expression in a work that its creator seeks to shield from public
scrutiny.
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have taken over time,42 remain perfectly suited to redressing
disseminative harm.
The following examples illustrate the basic working of
disseminative harms and (prima facie43) privative copyright claims
under modern U.S. copyright law:
•

A maintains a personal diary that he never shows anyone, in which he records
his candid observations of the world around him. It falls into the hands of B,
who seeks to publish it without A’s permission. A can maintain an infringement
action against B for violations of his § 106(3) public distribution right (and the
reproduction right, under § 106(1)44).

•

M, a musician, produces an early version of a new musical composition that he
is wary about. Before he can finalize it, he dies. The composition gets into the
hands of a music publisher, P, who seeks to publish it. M’s heirs can bring an
infringement action against P for violations of M’s public distribution right
under § 106(3).

•

X sends Y a private email message, in which he sets out his views on various
political subjects. In order to shame X, Y then forwards on the email to a public
listserv group. X can maintain an infringement action for violation of his public
distribution right under § 106(3).

•

P sends his doctor, D, a close-up photograph of his face for a diagnosis. He takes
the photograph with his cell phone camera, and it shows a dark mole on his
mouth that he is worried about. D treats it and later, without P’s consent, posts
the picture on his public website as an example of the skin conditions that he
has successfully treated. P can bring an infringement action against D for
violation of his public display right under § 106(5).

These examples all have a few things in common. Each
infringement action is driven by nonpecuniary considerations. Instead,
in each instance, the putative plaintiff seeks to curb the dissemination
of the work, since it represents something personal to her. Part of what
makes the work personal to the author in each case is the fact that the
author’s identity is readily discernible from the face of the work. In most
of the examples, identity is discernible as an objective matter; however,
in one (the musician) it is at best subjectively discernible. As we shall
see, privative copyright claims have evolved to encompass this
42. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 39, at § 8.11[A].
43. These are only illustrations of a plaintiff’s potential prima facie case and do not cover
potential defenses that a defendant might be able to raise—whether successfully or not—including
fair use, implied license, and first sale. These are discussed later, in the context of understanding
how courts should go about adjudicating privative copyright claims. See infra Section IV.B.
44. This is a prime illustration of the idea noted above, see discussion supra note 41, that
privative copyright claims can implicate additional rights that are not themselves central to
disseminative harm. In this illustration, publishing the diary involves making copies of it—which
is a violation of the reproduction right. Yet if the publisher were to merely make copies and do
nothing more, i.e., keep it locked up, it would clearly not produce the disseminative harm, for which
distribution is essential. Thus for disseminative harm, the violation of the distribution right takes
analytical precedence over violations of the reproduction right, even though as a purely legal
matter there is no difference.
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subjectivity as well. In each instance, then, the work is not just an
artifact for its creator; it is instead a representation of the author’s self.
In short, privative claims attempt to redress a form of
noneconomic copyright harm that is routinely ignored in modern
discussions of copyright law—disseminative harm—and they do so
primarily through the distribution right, and on occasion via the display
right, even though they often implicate other rights. Disseminative
harm is authorial in its roots and emerges from the strong dignitary
interest that the creator has in the work. And while the claim is
strongest for unpublished works, it by no means is limited to that
category, except that the nature of the harm (and the corresponding
interest) gets significantly attenuated when the author has voluntarily
relinquished control over the work through publication or public
distribution.
B. Disseminative Harm as Compelled Authorship
As discussed above, disseminative harm is strongly rooted in the
ideas of personality and personal autonomy. Interestingly, a poignant
and direct account of disseminative harm can be found in the work of
German philosopher Immanuel Kant, considered to be the foremost
philosopher to have theorized the nature and role of individual
autonomy.
Kant has long been associated with a highly nuanced and deeply
influential deontological account of human autonomy.45 Kant’s moral
and ethical philosophy on the topic has since been internalized into an
account of legal rights by legal philosophers, which has spawned a
voluminous body of scholarship.46 Initially, Kant’s accounts of property
and private wrongs were often used by theorists of intellectual property

45. For some of Kant’s most important contributions to moral philosophy, see IMMANUEL
KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (Mary J. Gregor trans., Cambridge 1999) (1787);
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood, eds. & trans.,
Cambridge 1999) (1781); IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary
J. Gregor & Jens Timmermann eds. & trans., Cambridge 2012) (1785); and IMMANUEL KANT, THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge 2017) (1797).
46. See, e.g., B. SHARON BYRD & JOACHIM HRUSCHKA, KANT AND LAW (2017); ARTHUR
RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2009); ERNEST J.
WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (2012); Peter Benson, External Freedom According to Kant,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 559 (1987); George P. Fletcher, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value, 22
U.W. ONT. L. REV. 171 (1984); George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 533 (1987); Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48
STAN. L. REV. 385 (1996); Thomas C. Grey, Serpents and Doves: A Note on Kantian Legal Theory,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 580 (1987); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 449 (1991); Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls, 92 VA. L.
REV. 1391 (2006).
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to construct a nonutilitarian account of such rights.47 This approach
prevailed until somewhat recently, when a relatively obscure standalone essay by Kant directly on the subject of authors’ rights came to
light.48 In this essay, Kant attempts to connect some of his thinking on
autonomy and agency to the working of copyright, and yet he does so
independently of property and ownership rhetoric.49 Instead, he
appears to identify a version of disseminative harm as a core concern of
authors’ rights.
Titled On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of
Books, Kant’s essay purports to derive a basis for why copyright law
treats the act of unauthorized publication as an actionable private
wrong.50 Kant’s logic originates in the recognition that there is a
fundamental difference between the ownership of the physical medium
in which the work is expressed and the work itself.51 To Kant, the work
is most fundamentally a communication, a “speech act,” on the part of
the author.52 When a publisher prints a book, the publisher is in turn
purporting to act on behalf of the author by communicating to her
audience.53 In situations when this is authorized, the author is speaking
to the public through the publisher.54 On the other hand, when
publication is unauthorized, the publisher is purporting to speak on
behalf of the author without the consent of the author—in turn forcing
the author to speak against her own will, acknowledge the existence of
the speech, and take responsibility for it.55 In this sense, the

47. See, e.g., Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49
DUKE L.J. 383 (1999) (justifying a right to publicity based in autonomy using Kantian philosophy).
It is worth noting that in the German legal tradition, scholars appear to have been aware of Kant’s
essay much earlier and they developed theories of copyright that came to influence the copyright
regime in Germany. See Sig Strömholm, Copyright – National and International Development, in
14 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: COPYRIGHT AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
3, 10–11 (Friederich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1990) (discussing the role of Otto von
Gierke in Germany’s copyright debates and noting his reliance on Kant’s essay to develop a
personality-based, rather than property-based, justification for authors’ rights).
48. See KANT 1785, supra note 31, at 29–35. For leading attempts to rationalize the essay
and employ it in theories of copyright law, see DRASSINOWER, supra note 24; Anne Barron, Kant,
Copyright and Communicative Freedom, 31 L. & PHIL. 1 (2012); and Leslie Kim Treiger-Bar-Am,
Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative Authorship, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1059
(2008).
49. See KANT 1785, supra note 31, at 29–30.
50. Id. at 27–29.
51. See id. at 33.
52. Id. at 35.
53. Id. at 32.
54. Id. at 30.
55. Id. at 31–32.
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unauthorized publication is therefore a form of “compelled speech,”
which is the basis for its wrongfulness in Kant’s view.56
Facially, Kant’s account may appear to be of little relevance to
privative copyright claims. Privative copyright claims are primarily
concerned with unauthorized distributions, whereas Kant’s focus is on
reproductions. Additionally, Kant appears to limit himself to a category
of works that bear a strong resemblance to speech, namely writings.57
All the same, there remains an important continuity between Kant’s
derivation and the logic of disseminative harm that becomes apparent
as one digs deeper.
At the core of Kant’s reasoning is the idea that publication and
authorship are acts of communication, the latter direct and the former
intermediated.58 The author’s autonomy is violated in an unauthorized
publication—not mere reproduction—since the publisher is purporting
to communicate on behalf of the author without authorization to do so.
Where then does this leave an unauthorized dissemination of the kind
at issue in privative copyright claims?
Recall that the paradigmatic privative copyright claim remains
a situation where the author of a work chooses to keep it private, or in
very limited circulation. Indeed, under common law copyright, the work
needed to be unpublished.59 Disseminative harm, described earlier,
thus emerges principally in situations where a defendant engages in
the act of “publication” or a “public display” of the work, without the
authorization of its creator. And in so doing, the defendant is effectively
compelling the creator of the work to assume responsibility for it as its
author.
The parallel between Kant’s account and privative claims now
starts to become clear. Kant’s idea that forcing the author to speak each
time there is an unauthorized republication of the work in the author’s
name amounts to a form of compelled speech60 might be logically
extended one step earlier in the chain of events. Forcing a creator of the
expression at issue to speak at all and thereby assume the mantle of
author and its attendant moral responsibilities and consequences is
nothing less than an act of compelled authorship. And, insofar as it
56. See id. Kant himself does not use the phrase. The phrase is best known in the work of
Abraham Drassinower, who builds a justification for copyright around Kantian thinking. See
DRASSINOWER, supra note 24, at 111–44 (characterizing his analytical framework as “[a]dopting
Kant’s framework”).
57. See KANT 1785, supra note 31, at 30.
58. See id. (describing publishers as controlling the speech of authors to readers).
59. See Laurence N. Walker, Publication and the Copyright Law Revision, 50 CALIF. L. REV.
672, 674–76 (1962) (illustrating the rule that one who publicly presents an unpublished work
retains his common law rights in that work).
60. KANT 1785, supra note 31, at 31–32.
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forces an individual to assume responsibilities against her will, it is no
less a denial of that individual’s agency and autonomy, which renders
it just as wrongful in Kant’s deontological scheme and triggers an
actionable private right.
While this may seem like an extension of Kant’s logic in the
essay to the case of disseminative harm, in reality Kant alludes to it
later in the same essay. As he concludes his argument, all works of art
are exempt from this analysis, because in Kant’s view, such works may
be freely reproduced by anyone.61 His rationale for this is the
uniqueness of artworks and the fact that once brought into existence,
works of art—unlike literary works—assume a thinglike independence.
As he puts it:
This, then, is the reason that all works of art of another may be copied for sale to the
public whereas books that already have their appointed publisher may not be reprinted:
the first are works (opera), whereas the second are actions (operae): the former can exist
on their own, as things, whereas the latter can have their existence only in a person. Hence
these latter belong exclusively to the person of the author.62

This is an intriguing observation that has received little
attention even from scholars who have hitherto analyzed Kant’s essay.
Kant appears to be suggesting that there is something “person[al]”
about one category of works (writing) that is absent in another (art),
and yet offers no real basis for this distinction.63 The basis for the
distinction appears to be that books have a personal dimension
associated with them since they always reveal the identity of their
creator, which is rarely (or never) the case for works of art once brought
into existence. This explains why book publishing is an act of speaking,
since identity and content are indelibly bound up therein; this is not so
with art. It traces back to the distinction between artifact autonomy,
where the owner’s autonomy is entirely in the res (thing) at issue, and
personal autonomy, where the autonomy (or its denial) directly
implicates the individual’s own self.
If this reading is correct, it has important implications for
privative copyright claims, which almost always involve a personal
dimension where the author has invested an identifiable element of her
personality into the work. A good part of what triggers the injury
associated with disseminative harm is the fact that the author is forced
to self-identify as the creator of an expression that was intended to be
kept out of circulation. This self-identification emanates from the fact
that the work itself reveals the identity of its creator in some way.

61. Id. at 34–35.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id.
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Privative claims therefore revolve primarily around works that entail a
personal dimension in the sense that Kant identifies in his derivation—
letters, personal papers, diaries, and, in more modern times, “selfies,”
for instance.64
Kant’s deontological rationale in his 1785 essay thus provides an
excellent justification for privative copyright claims and the
disseminative harm that they are rooted in. Built around ideas of
autonomy, communicative freedom, and private right, it in many ways
works better as a justification for disseminative harm than for
appropriative harm, the original target of Kant’s derivation. Authorship
is a moral responsibility, in addition to entailing legal consequences.
When this is foisted on an individual against her will, the denial of
autonomy that it entails by purporting to substitute the individual’s
agency for that of the disseminator produces the wrong that is privately
actionable.
II. DISSEMINATIVE HARM, PRIVACY, AND THE RIGHT OF DISCLOSURE
While the dignitary interest that lies at the root of disseminative
harm draws on considerations of privacy and personality, it is both
analytically and normatively distinct from both ideas. Over the last
several decades, privative copyright claims have come to be criticized
rather extensively by scholars and courts on the basis that the interest
underlying them is better protected through privacy claims. This
approach misunderstands the nature of privative claims in copyright
and the centrality of authorial autonomy that underlies them.
This Part examines the criticism of privative copyright claims
and refutes it. It begins in Section II.A by examining the principal
strands of the argument in favor of privacy (over copyright) as a
mechanism of protecting dignitary interests. It then moves, in Section
II.B, to unpacking the origins of privacy torts in American law and
shows how the famous derivation of privacy logic by Warren and
Brandeis consciously misstated several aspects of common law
copyright as it existed at the time, and its protection for dignitary
interests. Section II.C shows that the real analog of privative copyright
claims in Anglo-American copyright law is a lesser-known moral right
that is routinely invoked in civil law jurisdictions: the moral right of

64. A caveat is in order here. While the paradigm case of a privative claim involves work that
readily identifies its creator, the category has since grown to encompass works where this element
is more subjective. The next Part discusses this expansion of the category over time. As will be
seen, a good part of the reason for this expansion appears to be courts’ implicit unwillingness to
police the idea of authorial personality contained within the work. See infra Part III.

2020]

PRIVATIVE COPYRIGHT

21

disclosure, which also focuses on disseminative harm, but with more
limitations.
A. Privacy Torts, Not Copyright
Modern copyright scholarship is deeply critical of privative
copyright claims; this criticism is premised on the argument that the
dignitary interests and harms that underlie such claims are best dealt
with through the law of privacy—specifically privacy torts—at the state
level.65 This view has only grown since the passage of the new copyright
statute and the elimination of common law copyright for most subject
matter in 1976. Even the few scholars who are sympathetic to privative
copyright claims describe them as an “emerging scenario”66 and do not
go far enough in refuting the dominant view that “copyright is not the
direct vehicle for the[ ] vindication”67 of dignitary concerns, since it risks
converting authorship into censorship. The dominant view is driven by
three primary concerns, none of which withstands close scrutiny:
copyright utilitarianism, free speech concerns, and the perception that
privacy torts are better suited to address dignitary harms.

65. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual Property Rights Have
Been Asserted?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 549, 557–65, 587 (2015) (“[A]ssertions of protection for markets
beyond the protected market—be they in relation to privacy and reputational interests or more
generally—raise the specter of great cost to society.”); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Privacy, Copyright, and
Letters, 3 ELON L. REV. 161, 163 (2012) (“In the context of copyright law, privacy is really
something to be avoided.”); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1130 (1990) (“[C]opyright law is grotesquely inappropriate to protect privacy and obviously was
not fashioned to do so.”); Margaret McKeown, Censorship in the Guise of Authorship: Harmonizing
Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 16 (2016) (explaining that
copyright is not the “direct vehicle” for advancing privacy interests); Alfred Yen, The Challenge of
Following Good Advice About Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.
412, 413 (2016) (explaining that allowing a plaintiff to succeed on a copyright claim brought in the
interest of personal privacy does not do much to protect the plaintiff’s incentive to create). But see
Andrew Gilden, Copyright’s Market Gibberish, 94 WASH. L. REV. 1020, 1022 (2019) (arguing that
copyright routinely protects noneconomic interests, including dignitary harms, but masks this
protection in the language of the market); Deirdre Keller, Copyright to the Rescue: Should
Copyright Protect Privacy?, 20 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 36 (2016) (finding such protection legitimate
but suggesting that U.S. law recognize a moral right of disclosure).
66. Margaret Chon, Copyright’s Other Functions, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 364, 364
(2016). It is worth noting that, overall, Chon appears to be sympathetic to the recognition of privacy
and dignitary claims in copyright law. See id. at 366 (“Privacy and other functions of copyright
should not be categorically excluded as beyond the legitimate purview of copyright’s concerns, and
copyright will not be stretched beyond its breaking point by incorporating them.”). For a more
recent account that is critical of deploying copyright for general privacy purposes, while
nevertheless recognizing the existence of a few domains where such use might be legitimate, see
Eric Goldman & Jessica Silbey, Copyright’s Memory Hole, 2019 B.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming).
67. McKeown, supra note 65, at 16.
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1. Copyright Utilitarianism
The principal reason for the extensive skepticism toward
privative copyright claims emanates from the belief that copyright’s
exclusive purpose lies in it serving as a market-based incentive for the
production of creative works. Deriving from the seemingly
instrumentalist wording of the Constitution and its mandate that
copyright legislation strive to “promote . . . Progress,”68 this view roots
all of the copyright system in the need to provide creators with an
inducement to produce original expression through the market.69
According to this view, since privative claims derive from a strong
dignitary interest and since the creators at issue are unmoved by
pecuniary considerations, copyright law ought to pay (little or) no
attention to them. Infringement lawsuits brought exclusively to
vindicate a dignitary interest—that is, lawsuits with no commercial or
economic rationale—ought to be discouraged.70
Accepting copyright’s utilitarian logic as its principal theoretical
justification certainly does not necessitate denying the existence of
other nonutilitarian normative values operating within the system.
While normatively essentialist accounts of legal doctrines and
institutions may present a degree of theoretical elegance in discussions
of the system, they routinely fail to capture the practical machinations
of legal doctrines and the complex behavioral motivations of the
participants involved.71
What such essentialist accounts also ignore is the simple reality
that copyright doctrine—with the exception of one statutory
provision72—shows no marked affinity for the utilitarian rationale as
its dominant, let alone exclusive, justification. This has in turn allowed
the facially neutral language of copyright doctrine to adapt itself to
varying normative considerations over time, in precisely the same

68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
69. See Balganesh, supra note 2, at 1576–77 (“Copyright law is thus thought to exist
primarily to give authors (that is, creators) an incentive to create and thereafter disseminate their
works publicly.”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
70. See McKeown, supra note 65, at 16 (“[C]opyright cannot be everything to everybody.”).
71. For what is perhaps the best known critique of this essentialism in academic legal
theorizing involving law and economics, see Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some
Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 458–59 (1974) (noting how the economic analysis
of law underemphasizes the complexity of human behavior and is driven by an effort to avoid the
“complexity” of the real legal system).
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012) (requiring courts to examine “the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work” as part of the fair use analysis).
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manner as the rest of the common law.73 Copyright’s infringement
analysis is a prime example here, as is the joint works doctrine.74
Therefore, while it may well be true as a normative and interpretive
matter that today’s copyright thinking desires an exclusively utilitarian
framing for the institution, this is hardly an essential attribute of the
system such that deontological considerations, such as the author’s
dignitary interest, have no place in it.
In short then, the overt utilitarian turn in copyright law, which
some see as emanating from the influence of twentieth century
neoclassical economic thinking,75 is far from a principled reason to
critique the legitimacy of privative copyright claims. To the contrary,
normative pluralism has remained a hallmark of the copyright
landscape, much like it has for a variety of legal institutions. Courts
and scholars may find such pluralism messy and hard to theorize, yet
in practice it has served copyright rather well over time. Privative
copyright claims, as we shall see, predate copyright’s utilitarian turn.
2. Free Speech Concerns
A second argument often raised against the use of copyright law
to protect an author’s dignitary interests via privative claims is a
concern with free speech, or the idea that authorship might be used as
a vehicle for censorship. As an illustration of this concern, the recent
case of Garcia v. Google, Inc.76 is often raised to show how the plaintiff’s
nonpecuniary motives were little more than an attempt to squelch
speech. Garcia involved a Plaintiff who, without her knowledge, came
to be portrayed in a controversial and offensive motion picture, and
thereafter sought to have the motion picture taken down from public
viewing by arguing that she was the sole author of her individual
performance in the work.77 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit denied her claim, but in so doing noted that her claim was of a
dignitary nature, which was inappropriate for copyright law since it
73. For an account of how this might occur, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in the Common Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1241 (2015). Jody
Kraus has described a similar evolution in common law meaning as the process of “radical
semantic evolution.” Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication:
A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 326 (2007).
74. For pluralist accounts of these doctrines, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity
of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203 (2012); and Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Unplanned
Coauthorship, 100 VA. L. REV. 1683 (2014).
75. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
306–07 (1996) (“An approach to copyright based on . . . neoclassical and new institutional economic
property theory has emerged as the principal theoretical support for copyright expansionism.”).
76. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
77. See id. at 737–38.
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sought to suppress speech.78 The court echoed the idea that privacy was
not the function of copyright law and noted: “We are sympathetic to her
plight. Nonetheless, the claim against Google is grounded in copyright
law, not privacy, emotional distress, or tort law, and Garcia seeks to
impose speech restrictions under copyright laws meant to foster rather
than repress free expression.”79
The concern with free speech, seen in the court’s framing and
elsewhere, is overstated. In some sense, there was nothing uniquely
speech-suppressive in the Plaintiff’s argument in Garcia; nor did she
seek a remedy different from that sought by any ordinary copyright
plaintiff in a takedown action. Indeed, as scholars have pointed out, all
requests for injunctive relief in copyright cases involve speech
suppression as an analytical matter, and copyright has never had a
problem with this reality as a matter of principle.80 Instead, courts have
over time found ways and means to balance these competing concerns
and incorporate them into the calculus for such relief.
It is worth noting that the idea of free speech is a common
rhetorical device that courts use to their advantage to justify outcomes,
as seen in the Garcia opinion. In Garcia, the Ninth Circuit used it to
deny relief.81 This is in contrast to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,82 where speech
considerations were treated as overblown since copyright was itself “the
engine of free expression.”83 At other times, courts have reiterated that
copyright’s multiple safety valves—fair use, the idea/expression
dichotomy, and the like—are sufficient to guard against any free speech
concerns.84 Yet, the Ninth Circuit made no mention of this.
Copyright has various devices protective of free speech that can
come into play in privative claims. The most notable of these is fair use.
Indeed, a scrutiny of various privative copyright claims indicates that
in several such cases, defendants raise the defense of fair use, which
courts use as a stand-in for free speech concerns and balance against
the plaintiff’s claims.85 Given the robustness of these mechanisms,
78. See id. at 747 (describing the claim as a “classic prior restraint of speech”).
79. Id. at 737.
80. See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 165 (1998) (explaining that copyright injunction determinations
are historically and presently pro-plaintiff).
81. 786 F.3d at 747.
82. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
83. Id. at 558.
84. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (“[C]opyright law contains built-in
First Amendment accommodations.”).
85. See, e.g., Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 758–61 (6th Cir. 2012); Monge v. Maya
Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1170–83 (9th Cir. 2012).
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there appears to be no credible concern that, as a principled matter,
copyright protection for dignitary or privacy concerns risks converting
authorship into censorship.
3. Better Fit
Courts and scholars also commonly dismiss any copyright
protection for dignitary concerns with the argument that privacy law—
privacy tort law in particular—is a better fit for such concerns.86 Part
of this objection has to do with the normative essentialism discussed
previously and the belief that privative claims are hard to reconcile with
copyright’s utilitarian basis. Relatedly, though, it also derives from the
idea that privacy torts are better suited to protecting dignitary
interests. It is this last point that deserves some additional attention.
As noted earlier, the dignitary interest underlying disseminative
harm and privative copyright claims entails more than just a concern
with privacy. It implicates considerations of personality and personal
autonomy, in the way of authorial autonomy. This is hardly an
incidental feature of such actions—it is central to their existence. And
the involvement of authorial autonomy adds a distinctive component to
the action that takes it away from a mere concern with privacy. Courts
routinely overlook this point.87
To fully appreciate this divergence, consider the difference
between an intimate photograph taken by the person who is both the
subject of the photograph and its author (the “selfie”), and an intimate
photograph taken by a third party without the subject’s consent (the
“paparazzi photo”). An unauthorized public distribution of the
photograph is likely to be seen as troubling by the subject of the photo
in both instances, but for similar yet qualitatively distinct reasons.
With the paparazzi photo, both the creation and distribution of
the photo are incursions on the subject’s ability to represent intimate
details about himself or herself to the world in public. With the selfie,
the creation is obviously not an issue, but its distribution is. Here, the

86. See, e.g., Garcia, 786 F.3d at 745 (“Privacy laws, not copyright, may offer remedies
tailored to [Plaintiff’s] personal and reputational harms.”); New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry
Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1505 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“An individual who seeks to protect the
privacy of the content of private letters may do so by bringing suit under the right of privacy.”).
87. Indeed, they overlook this point even while granting a plaintiff’s claims. See, e.g., Monge,
688 F.3d at 1168–73 (omitting any discussion of the Plaintiff’s status as author of the works at
issue, even while finding in favor of the Plaintiff). Garcia, which is routinely—and wrongly—set
forth as an example of a failed privacy or dignitary claim, involved a fundamental contest to the
authorial status of the Plaintiff, which made it qualitatively different from a regular privative
claim since the very existence of a valid authorial dignitary interest was thereby contested. See
786 F.3d at 740–45.

26

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1:1

distribution of the photograph certainly amounts to an interference
with the subject’s self-representation to the world, but that interference
is compounded by the representation of the subject’s own authorship to
the public. In other words, what is harmful to the subject is not just a
revelation of the intimate details contained in the photograph but also
the disclosure of the subject’s own authorship of those details in the
photograph. The two are inextricably bound up, rendering the selfie
different from the paparazzi photograph. The subject-authored nature
of the expression adds an important component to the nature of the
concerns that the subject is likely to have, making it distinct in an
important way from the nonconsensual paparazzi photograph.
The fact that the subject authored the photograph himself or
herself makes the harm from the unauthorized distribution more—
rather than less—significant, in that the subject-driven (and thus more
authentic) nature of the creation is itself potentially more damaging to
the author-subject. The photograph was created for one purpose, as
determined by its author, yet used by the defendant for another. This
act represents a denial of autonomy to the subject of the photograph,
not just in her capacity as subject but more importantly in her capacity
as subject-author, where the two cannot be disconnected.
These two scenarios might be contrasted with a third where a
professional photographer takes an intimate photograph of a subject
with the subject’s consent (the “posed photo”). Now the subject of the
photograph has no claim, be it in privacy or copyright, against the
professional photographer because of the subject’s consent (in the case
of privacy) and the photographer’s authorship and ownership of the
work (in the case of copyright). If a third party seeks to make an
unauthorized distribution of the photograph, the subject is now
dependent on the photographer bringing the action.88 No considerations
of authorial autonomy are implicated for the subject of the photograph.
Should the subject (as transferee of the copyright) seek to bring a claim
against the third party, it would be primarily as owner of the work—
based on the idea of artifact autonomy. The contrast between these
three scenarios above serves to highlight how the dignitary interest
underlying privative copyright claims functions.
Privative copyright claims therefore involve a combination of
representational and authorial concerns that are incapable of
disaggregation. Privacy torts, most notably the tort of public disclosure
of private facts, focus on representational autonomy and the

88. As was the case in Balsley. See 691 F.3d at 755 (“Plaintiffs sought ownership of the
photographs so that they would have a legal means of ending the photographs’ dissemination.”).
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individual’s ability to control public representations of her persona.89
They view the denial of such autonomy as emanating from the subject’s
choice to keep certain facets of her persona private, and then scrutinize
the existence and parameters of that choice rather carefully. The
nonconsensual public disclosure of such facts is seen to cast the subject
into the public and in turn produce potential emotional and
reputational harm. This analytical structure is ill-suited to situations
where the subject exercises a critical role in the production of the
content that is made public and then chooses to control whether and
when to disseminate it. In these situations, the subject’s autonomy is
not just about self-representation to the public but instead about selfrepresentation to the public as author. And this makes privative
copyright claims a rather poor fit for privacy torts.90 Adjudicating such
claims will involve addressing questions such as the appropriate scope
of authorship, which privacy torts are unconcerned with.
In summary, the claim that disseminative harm and its
underlying deontological interest are better served through privacy
laws does not withstand serious analytical and normative scrutiny. It
instead emanates from an overly simplistic understanding of the
interests involved in such claims, coupled with an exalted view of what
privacy torts can cover. Indeed, hardly any scholar or court advancing
the view that privacy law rather than copyright should be where these
claims are brought has actually shown how privative copyright claims
and the interests that they seek to vindicate might actually work under
the tort of privacy. In the end, much of the argument appears to be
driven by a desire to maintain a normatively coherent account of
copyright law, which, ironically, contradicts the very evolution of the
privacy/copyright divide.

89. The continued viability of this tort remains suspect, and scholars have long noted how its
invocation is strongly disfavored. See, e.g., Samantha Barbas, The Death of the Public Disclosure
Tort: A Historical Perspective, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171 (2010); John A. Jurata Jr., The Tort
that Refuses to Go Away: The Subtle Reemergence of Public Disclosure of Private Facts, 36 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 489 (1999).
90. Indeed, there are aspects of privacy law doctrine that render it inapposite for privative
copyright claims. If one considers the privacy tort of “public disclosure of private facts,” a rather
fundamental requirement is that the content disclosed is “highly offensive to a reasonable person,”
which is a largely objective determination. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D(a) (AM. LAW
INST. 1977). This would eliminate a huge swath of privative copyright claims that are hardly
offensive on their face, but nevertheless remain an affront to the dignitary interest of the author.
Additionally, the tort’s concept of “public disclosure” does not track the concept of “publication”
such that private or semiprivate communications that are not accessible by members of the public
are unlikely to qualify as violations. See id. § 652D cmt. a (“ ‘Publicity,’ on the other hand, means
that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons
that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.”).
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B. Warren and Brandeis and the Privacy/Copyright Conflation
As discussed above, courts and scholars routinely take the
position that while privacy and dignitary interests are legitimate and
deserve some protection, they are nevertheless not relevant to copyright
and its purposes.91 The criticism is closely tied to the independent
development and flourishing of “privacy torts,” private causes of action
under state law that purport to protect a plaintiff’s reputational,
personal, and emotional interests against invasion by defendants.92 The
origin of these privacy torts is commonly traced to a seminal article
penned at the end of the nineteenth century by Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis, wherein they articulated a rationale and analytical
basis for the common law to develop an independent set of actions for
privacy.93 Consequently, their argument is seen today as the basis for
excising personal, dignitary considerations from copyright and
quarantining them into the independent category of privacy torts.
The Warren and Brandeis argument, however, betrays an
important irony. In developing their logic and reasoning for the
protection of privacy—or the “right to be let alone,”94 as they put it—
Warren and Brandeis make an important move that scholars writing
about the copyright/privacy interface overlook or underplay. Warren
and Brandeis base the entirety of their reasoning on copyright law as it
worked at the time, specifically on the extant protection that
nineteenth-century copyright law afforded disseminative harm through
privative claims for infringement. Warren and Brandeis make the
entire premise of their article abundantly clear fairly early on, with the
observation that “the legal doctrines relating to infractions of what is
ordinarily termed the common law right to intellectual and artistic
property are, it is believed, but instances and applications of a general
right to privacy, which properly understood afford a remedy for the evils
under consideration.”95 In attempting to derive the logic for an
independent right to privacy, the article goes to some length to attempt

91. See, e.g., Leval, supra note 65 at 1130 (“[C]opyright law is grotesquely inappropriate to
protect privacy and obviously was not fashioned to do so.”). Judge Leval took the same position in
one of his opinions addressing the question at the district court level. See New Era Publ’ns Int’l,
695 F. Supp. at 1504 (“It is universally recognized, however, that the protection of privacy is not
the function of our copyright law.”).
92. See Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805 (2010);
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
93. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 198.
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to undermine the legitimacy of privative claims and disseminative
harm within copyright. Yet its reasoning to this end is spurious.
As noted above, Warren and Brandeis locate the general logic of
privacy within the domain of copyright, specifically within common law
copyright, since statutory copyright at the time did not apply to
unpublished works, a distinction that has since been abrogated. They
then set out the core of their argument with the following description of
copyright protection and privative claims:
The existence of this right [i.e., copyright] does not depend upon the particular method of
expression adopted. . . . Neither does the existence of the right depend upon the nature or
value of the thought or emotion, nor upon the excellence of the means of expression. . . .
In every such case the individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be
given to the public. No other has the right to publish his productions in any form, without
his consent. . . . The right is lost only when the author himself communicates his
production to the public . . . . [T]he common-law protection enables him to control
absolutely the act of publication, and in the exercise of his own discretion, to decide whether
there shall be any publication at all.96

If copyright law at the time covered what they were advocating,
what then was the basis for taking it out of copyright, and into a distinct
cause of action? For them, the answer lay in copyright’s supposedly
mistaken reliance on the notion of “property.” They thus argue:
But where the value of the production is found not in the right to take the profits arising
from publication, but in the peace of mind or the relief afforded by the ability to prevent
any publication at all, it is difficult to regard the right as one of property, in the common
acceptation of that term. . . . [T]he protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions, expressed through the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in
preventing publication, is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right
of the individual to be let alone. It is like the right not to be assaulted or beaten, the right
not to be imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously prosecuted, the right not to be
defamed. . . . The principal which protects personal writings and all other personal
productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in any
form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate
personality.97

As support for this observation, they cite to a leading nineteenthcentury copyright law treatise, which merely notes that the term
property as applied to privative claims was “an expression perhaps not
quite satisfactory, but on the other hand sufficiently descriptive of a
right which, however incorporeal, involves many of the essential
elements of property, and is at least positive and definite.”98 They then
rather hastily surmise that the primary reason that the law had been
96. Id. at 198–200 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
97. Id. at 200–01, 205 (footnotes omitted).
98. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS, DRAMATIC
AND MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS, LETTERS AND OTHER MANUSCRIPTS, ENGRAVINGS AND SCULPTURE,
AS ENACTED AND ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA; WITH SOME NOTICES OF THE HISTORY
OF LITERARY PROPERTY 94 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd., 2005) (1847).
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using the term “property” for these claims was in order to make the
entitlement applicable against the world at large—that is, in rem—
citing to the landmark copyright case of Folsom v. Marsh, which
involved a dispute over the publication of George Washington’s
collected letters.99 Warren and Brandeis argue that Justice Story’s
adoption of the property idea for copyright in that case was in order to
overcome the notion of privity that would have precluded an action for
breach of an implied contract.100 Yet a close reading of the opinion
hardly suggests this motive but instead merely indicates that Justice
Story recognized the ability of the owner to go after third parties not in
privity as a consequence of such ownership.101
What their analysis misses is the reality that by the nineteenth
century, common law copyright—or indeed all of copyright—no longer
needed to be characterized as “property” for its in rem nature to be
accepted. While courts and scholars did continue to refer to copyright
as “literary property,” the act of unauthorized copying had quite
independently come to be understood as an injurious wrong analogous
to a regular tort that allowed an action to be brought against third
parties independent of a contract.102 To the extent that courts deployed
property language, it is fairly obvious that they were doing so as part of
their dicta and for largely expository—rather than analytical—
purposes.
Nevertheless, by emphasizing the connection between copyright
claims and the idea of property, Warren and Brandeis were making an
implicit analytical move that proved to be influential. And this was the

99. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
100. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 93, at 211 (“Thus, the courts, in searching for some
principle upon which the publication of private letters could be enjoined, naturally came upon the
ideas of a breach of confidence, and of an implied contract; but . . . this doctrine could not afford all
the protection required . . . .”).
101. Justice Story thus observes: “The general property in the manuscripts remains in the
writer and his representatives, as well as the general copyright. A fortiori, third persons, standing
in no privity with either party, are not entitled to publish them, to subserve their own private
purposes of interest or curiosity, or passion.” Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 346. His use of the term “a
fortiori” clearly implies the identification of a consequence rather than a cause, contrary to what
Warren and Brandeis claim.
102. As an example, consider the 1834 Supreme Court case of Wheaton v. Peters. 33 U.S. 591
(1834). Wheaton was the first copyright case decided by the Court and centered on the existence of
common law copyright after the enactment of the federal copyright statute in 1791. See id. at 592.
What is interesting to note, however, is that even though the Court (and the litigants) use property
rhetoric in the case, the action itself was brought using an “action on the case,” id. at 596, a writ
that had developed to conflate the distinction between property and personal actions, and had
come to recognize that the existence of a property interest could be secondary to the existence of
an injurious wrongdoing by the defendant. See Keeble v. Hickeringill (1707) 103 Eng. Rep. 1127;
see also Elizabeth Jean Dix, The Origins of the Action of Trespass on the Case, 46 YALE L.J. 1142
(1937).
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idea that property implied an economic motivation, which privative
copyright claims lacked, in contrast to more standard pecuniary
copyright claims. The idea of property thus served to drive a wedge
between standard (meaning economic) copyright claims and privative
copyright claims, with the latter then seemingly more aligned with
other nonpecuniary causes of action.
An additional reason for courts’ invocation of property in dealing
with privative copyright claims—which Warren and Brandeis happily
ignore—relates to the remedy that plaintiffs ordinarily sought in those
cases, namely, an injunction. As is well known, equity allowed an
injunction to follow whenever an entitlement was classified as a form of
“property,” an artificial classification that came under criticism fairly
early on and was eventually repudiated.103 The early privative
copyright cases, many of which Warren and Brandeis rely on,104
routinely lean on this distinction in invoking their equitable jurisdiction
in favor of plaintiffs. The characterization of the copyright entitlement
as property had little analytical basis and was therefore a unique
product of equity’s own rigidity. None of this, of course, mattered to
Warren and Brandeis.
Given their explicit agenda, which was the identification and
derivation of an independently protectable privacy interest in the
common law, Warren and Brandeis had little need to be cautious in
their characterization of these past copyright cases and the language
therein. In relying on the emptiness of property language for their
argument, they offer no independent understanding of property as a
limiting idea to show that privacy is analytically (or normatively)
distinct from property. Indeed, they equivocated in their own analysis
by conceding that property may have meant little more than the right
to exclude (as an in rem entitlement), in which case courts’ invocation
of the idea for noneconomic harms might obviously seem less
problematic.105
Despite their reliance on common law copyright to derive the
right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis do not once mention a central
103. For an early account of this distinction, see Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief Against
Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L. REV. 640 (1916) (describing this position and
criticizing it).
104. As a prime example, consider the case of Gee v. Pritchard, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 678;
2 Swans. 403, 424–25 (emphasizing the nature of the copyright interest as property in order to
validate an injunction). Warren and Brandeis refer to Gee, but completely overlook this aspect of
the decision. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 93, at 200 n.3 (quoting the decision).
105. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 93, at 213 (“[T]he rights, so protected, whatever their
exact nature, are not rights arising from contract or from special trust, but are rights as against
the world; and, as above stated, the principle which has been applied to protect these rights is in
reality not the principle of private property . . . .”).
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feature of all the privative copyright claims that they rely on: namely,
that the action in each case was brought by the author of the work,
rendering it functionally a personal claim and throwing direct focus not
just on the representational issue but also on authorial autonomy.
Emphasizing the authorial aspect of privative copyright claims would
have perhaps undermined their case for a standalone right to privacy;
nevertheless, given the centrality of authorship as a normative matter
to those claims, its omission is stark.
Despite all of this, the Warren and Brandeis article had the
effect of influencing state courts in the creation of privacy torts.106 In
this development, though, courts seem to have paid scant attention to
the possibility of copyright—common law or statutory—offering
plaintiffs a more efficacious remedy in certain situations, given its
structure as a strict liability action and the statute’s provision of rather
direct and clear remedies, including statutory damages. The main
indirect effect over time was simply that these claims, which had once
been a legitimate part of copyright jurisprudence, eventually came to
be seen as palpably illegitimate within copyright.107 Copyright law’s
eventual utilitarian turn only served to solidify this view and build on
the property/nonproperty logic that the Warren and Brandeis article
put forth.
Even if Warren and Brandeis are seen to have made a
compelling argument for the development of independent privacy torts
and the existence of a “right to privacy,” nowhere does their analysis
recommend eliminating the personal claims that they identify from the
ambit of copyright law. To the contrary, insofar as they identify
copyright law to be a subset of a general action to protect individual
privacy, they seem to imply the continuing legitimacy of such claims
under copyright.108 While this may not be true for privacy claims that
involve neither authorial subject matter nor original expression, it is
certainly the case for material that involves one or both of these
elements. And yet, scholars have read the Warren and Brandeis article
as recommending a dramatic reduction in copyright’s scope, in
furtherance of a right to privacy.109
106. For an early discussion of this influence by 1960, see Prosser, supra note 92, at 384–89.
107. So much so that by 1985, the Supreme Court noted that “[i]t is true that common law
copyright was often enlisted in the service of personal privacy,” reversing the order that Warren
and Brandeis had identified in their argument. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 555 (1985).
108. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 93, at 195–98 (discussing copyright law as “the next
step which must be taken for protection of the person”).
109. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and
Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 654–55 (1991) (“Because they desired to construct a
right of privacy that extended protection to an entire inviolate personality and not just to its
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What is also perplexing, though perhaps an unremarkable
reality of its era, is that the Warren and Brandeis article offers no
normative justification for treating privacy claims as a separate cause
beyond a formalist treatment of the property idea. Nor does it offer any
structural or procedural reasons for it. To the contrary, it disregards
the possibility of there being strong normative reasons for retaining
these claims (at least partially, if not wholly) within copyright law—
reasons deriving from the ideas of authorship and authorial autonomy
discussed previously.
As Warren and Brandeis see it, disseminative harm is the very
basis of the right to privacy. While they may be right to see in it
elements of the need “to be let alone,” they altogether disregard the
centrality of authorship and self-expression in instances of such harm,
which formed the very basis for copyright’s inclusion of such harm
within its overall ambit. Much of their analysis is strongly persuasive
when it involves informational claims that do not involve original
expression or implicate third-party nonauthor plaintiffs.
Contrary to much of today’s accepted wisdom, then, the right to
privacy does not exhaust the gamut of claims and interests that
plaintiffs have over personal content. The intellectual lineage of the
Warren-Brandeis argument and their disaffection for the analytical and
normative basis of privative copyright claims on which they based their
entire analysis aptly reveal this point. The expanding domain of privacy
law coupled with the utilitarian turn in copyright have only served to
allow their argument to flourish, while ignoring the reality that
disseminative harm is a distinct form of harm within the panoply of
legitimate copyright harms.
C. Simulating (and Enlarging) the Moral Right of Disclosure
While privacy torts may thus be an imperfect home for the
dignitary interest involved in privative copyright claims, there is
nevertheless a cause of action recognized in some countries that
presents a closer analog: the moral right of disclosure.
Until the year 1990, federal copyright law consciously distanced
itself from providing authors with “moral rights,” a set of rights that

products, Warren and Brandeis believed that they were forced to dismantle the property law
structure of common law copyright.”). But see Pamela Samuelson, Protecting Privacy through
Copyright Law?, in PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 191 (Marc
Rotenberg et al. eds., 2015) (analyzing the privacy/copyright connection in the Warren & Brandeis
article and, unlike other scholars, remaining equivocal about allowing copyright to retake some of
the domain that has been excised from it in the name of privacy).
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have long been recognized and protected in civil law jurisdictions.110
Premised on the idea of ensuring respect for the work and the author’s
connection to it, these rights are seen as emanating from the very act of
authorship, inalienable and functionally distinct from copyright’s
exclusive economic rights.111 Of the myriad moral rights recognized in
these jurisdictions, the attribution right and the integrity right remain
the best known—and are indeed the only moral rights that are today
recognized at the federal level in the United States.112 A right that is
infrequently invoked, yet of some significance, is the right of disclosure.
The right of disclosure protects the author before her work is
released publicly. Until the author is ready to divulge or disclose it
publicly, the right allows her to prevent any dissemination of the work
against her wishes.113 As a corollary, it also allows the author to prevent
its dissemination if she chooses to abandon or discard the work without
publicly distributing it. Essential to the operation of the right is that
the work be deemed incomplete by the author.114 In essence, therefore,
it is directed at protecting the creative process and the author’s
autonomy and control over deciding when that process has terminated
and when the work is ready for release to the public—in other words,
the decision of when to become an author.
Upon joining the Berne Convention in 1989, Congress decided to
accord authors some minimal form of moral rights protection in the
United States, through the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990.115 It did
so by recognizing the rights of integrity and attribution, the only rights
110. For a general overview of moral rights protection, see MIRA T. SUNDARA RAJAN, MORAL
RIGHTS: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE AND NEW TECHNOLOGY 31–110 (2011); Arthur S. Katz, The
Doctrine of Moral Right and American Copyright Law—A Proposal, 24 S. CAL. L. REV. 75 (1951);
and Rigamonti, supra note 13.
111. See RAJAN, supra note 110, at 7 (explaining that notions of “the author as an independent
creator” coincided with the rise of the moral rights doctrine).
112. See Visual Artist Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012) (explicitly granting these
rights to “author[s] of a work of visual art”); see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the
Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985) (probing the
relationship between the 1976 Copyright Act and moral rights).
113. See Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under
French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 467–73 (1968); see also Adolf Dietz, The Moral Right of the
Author: Moral Rights and the Civil Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199, 203–06
(1995); Carl H. Settlemyer III, Note, Between Thought and Possession: Artists’ Moral Rights and
Public Access to Creative Works, 81 GEO. L.J. 2291, 2329–44 (1993).
114. As one leading scholar of French law put it:
So long as a work of art has not been completely created—of which the artist alone can
be the judge—it remains a mere expression of its creator’s personality, and has no
existence beyond that which he tentatively intends to give it. . . . He alone is able to
determine when it should be disclosed, put into circulation, and treated as a chattel
which may be exploited for profit.
Sarraute, supra note 113, at 467.
115. 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
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which the convention recognized.116 The legislative history of the 1976
Act reveals that Congress was well aware of the disclosure right and
made a conscious decision to avoid recognizing it in the statute at the
time.117 Congress adhered to this position in 1990.
Privative copyright claims operate as a substantial (if not
complete) replacement for the moral right of disclosure.118 Even prior to
the Act of 1976, common law copyright afforded authors protection for
their unpublished creations, which was seen as doing the same work as
the disclosure right.119 Indeed, in some respects the common law
protection was broader insofar as it was not limited to incomplete
works, unless of course the act of publication was seen as part of the
completion. With the abolition of common law copyright for published
works and the simultaneous elimination of publication as a prerequisite
for federal copyright protection, privative copyright claims—based on
the exclusive rights to publicly distribute and display the work—
operate as a full replacement for the disclosure right. In reality, post1976 claims go further than their common law equivalents in allowing
for protection even when the work is fixed and published, but not
publicly distributed or displayed.
The revenge pornography example, discussed above,120 offers a
useful illustration of this equivalence and indeed of the more protective
nature of privative copyright claims. The victim of the unauthorized
dissemination would not have had a claim under the moral right of
disclosure, for two interrelated reasons. First, from the moment the
picture was taken, it was complete; and second, it was indeed
“disclosed” in some sense, even if only to the private recipient. By
contrast, neither of these issues present obstacles to a successful
privative copyright claim.
Conversely, if one examines the most prominent continental
cases where the moral right of disclosure was successfully invoked, it is
apparent that they would each be sufficiently covered by the scope of
116. See id.; see also Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6
bis, Sept. 9, 1886, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27 (1986), 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (amended Sept. 28, 1979)
(affording authors certain moral rights protections).
117. William Strauss, Study No. 4: The Moral Right of the Author, in SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION
120–21 (Comm. Print 1961).
118. For an early recognition of this point, see James M. Treece, American Law Analogues of
the Author’s “Moral Right”, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 487, 493 (1968). For a recent argument advocating
for the right in order to protect privacy interests in American copyright law, see Keller, supra note
65, at 38.
119. See Treece, supra note 118, at 493 (comparing American “common law copyright” to the
French “right of disclosure”).
120. See discussion supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text (discussing the use of copyright
law to combat revenge pornography in Doe v. Elam).
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modern privative copyright claims. These cases usually involve a
familiar pattern.121 An artist enters into an agreement with a buyer to
produce a work of art and then prior to the work’s completion, the artist
either dies or abandons the project.122 When the buyer then chooses to
display and distribute the work publicly, the author (or her heirs)
successfully invokes the right of disclosure to prevent this from
happening.123 In the United States, under post-1976 copyright law,
these cases would all be covered by privative copyright claims—
emanating from the public distribution right, the public display right,
or both. The buyer’s actions in each instance unquestionably amount to
either a public distribution or public display which was not authorized
by the artist, allowing for a successful claim. Consequently, privative
copyright claims, especially after 1976, more than substitute for the
lack of a moral right of disclosure in U.S. copyright law.
Indeed, the normative logic for the existence of the right of
disclosure in continental jurisdictions originates from the idea of
avoiding disseminative harm to the author of the work. It stems from a
trenchant commitment to authorial autonomy, a commitment that
views the author or creator as the “master” of the work, with personal
and potentially idiosyncratic preferences and choices that nevertheless
deserve respect and serious validation in order to preserve such
autonomy.124 Such is the strength of this right that even in situations
where it would be objectively wasteful and meaningless to allow the
right to be exercised (and for the work to be withheld from the public),
the exercise of the right by an author is permitted in the interests of
preserving such autonomy.125 In Anglo-American copyright systems,
privative copyright claims afford authors nearly the same amount of
protection against disseminative harm as the moral right of disclosure.

121. See Sarraute, supra note 113, at 467–73 (discussing the Whistler, Camoin, Rouault, and
Bonnard cases).
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 467–68 (quoting Whistler v. Eden, Cour de cassation [Cass. 1e civ.] [supreme court
for judicial matters] Seine, Mar. 14, 1900, D.P. 1900, I, 497, 500 (Fr.) as using this language to
describe the artist’s control over the work).
125. This was the situation in the Camoin v. Carco case, where the artist had trashed his
incomplete work of art, but a third party found it and sought to restore and display it, which
resulted in the court siding with the artist and disallowing the third party’s actions despite the
obvious wastefulness of this outcome. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Mar.
6, 1931, D.P. 1931, II, 88, note Mast (Fr.).
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVATIVE COPYRIGHT CLAIMS
Privative copyright claims are almost as old as Anglo-American
copyright law itself. The logic underlying their functioning began to
take shape shortly after the passage of the Statute of Anne in 1710. In
the three centuries since, they have mutated and adapted to society’s
changing conceptions of privacy, personal autonomy, and copyright’s
coverage of new subject matter. This Part describes the evolution of
privative copyright claims since the early eighteenth century. Despite
its shifting contours, copyright law has remained steadfast in its
protection for the dignitary interest underlying these claims, a reality
that is often forgotten in modern discussions of the subject.
An examination of privative copyright claims over the years
reveals three interrelated trends that are worth describing at the
outset. First, fairly early on in the development of privative copyright
claims, we see courts disavowing an objective verification of the
dignitary interest involved—and the corresponding disseminative
harm—and instead allowing the author to assert a subjective
conception of the interest and corresponding harm from the defendant’s
actions. This had the obvious effect of expanding the scope of privative
claims.
Second, in keeping with the move away from assessing the
personal content of the work, we see courts occasionally justifying
privative copyright claims using an inchoate labor theory of
authorship.126 Unlike a Kantian approach based on authorial autonomy
(and compelled authorship), the labor-based account enabled courts to
focus on the process of authorship without having to examine or assess
the product of that process—that is, the content of the work.
Third, with the increased application of fair use to privative
copyright claims under the 1976 Act, copyright jurisprudence has
diluted the uniqueness and significance of the dignitary interest
involved. Courts either translate—simplistically—the interest involved
into economic terms, or they completely ignore the unique nature of the
interest and operate using the formal language of the law that is
outwardly agnostic to the nature of the interest at issue.

126. Inchoate only in the sense that it was never built into a fuller labor theory of ownership
along the lines offered by some applying Locke’s theory to copyright. For applications of Locke to
copyright, see Carys J. Craig, Locke, Labour, and Limiting the Author’s Right: A Warning Against
a Lockean Approach to Copyright, 28 QUEENS L.J. 1 (2002); Jonathan Peterson, Lockean Property
and Literary Works, 14 LEGAL THEORY 257 (2008); and Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law:
Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990).

38

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1:1

A. Early English Law
The earliest form of privative copyright claims involved private
letters, which at the time were seen as embodying an individual’s most
personal (and honest) statements about the world, meaning their
unauthorized publication and revelation could produce more than just
pecuniary harm. With the passage of the Statute of Anne in 1710,127 the
first Anglo-American copyright statute, it did not take long for a case
involving private letters to make its way to court. The case was also one
of the first ever copyright cases under the statute to be brought by an
author, the new recipient of rights under the legislation.128 The case was
Pope v. Curl, well known among copyright scholars and historians as
the first case to hold that copyright protection subsists in letters, even
when physical possession of those letters had been transferred to
another.129
Decided in 1741 by the Court of Chancery, Pope involved a claim
by the famous poet Alexander Pope against a Defendant bookseller who
sought to publish a collection of letters between Pope and the famed
author Jonathan Swift.130 The extremely short opinion of just one page
does little justice to the complexity of the case. As Mark Rose has
documented, the case was in many ways a setup wherein Pope sought
to manage his image “as a gentleman and a scholar rather than as a
professional.”131
When the Defendant in the case published Pope’s
correspondence without his authorization, Pope made his argument for
copyright infringement in personal rather than economic terms,
arguing that such publication was a form of “betraying Conversation”
and socially harmful.132 There appears to have been nothing
particularly problematic or embarrassing in the content of the letters
themselves, which Pope of course knew.133 This also pushed his legal
argument in the case (made forcefully by William Murray, who would
go on to become none other than Lord Mansfield, the noted copyright

127. Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Ann. c. 21 (Eng.) (repealed 1842).
128. See Mark Rose, The Author in Court: Pope v. Curll (1741), 21 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 197,
197–98 (1992) (describing Pope as “an important transitional moment in the concept of authorship
and author’s rights”).
129. See id.
130. See Pope v. Curl (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 608, 608; 2 Atk. 342, 342.
131. Rose, supra note 128, at 202.
132. Id. at 203–04.
133. See id. at 202–05.
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jurist134) in the direction of content neutrality by disentangling the
unauthorized dissemination from its underlying content.
The Defendant, however, sought to rebut Pope’s claim in two
primary ways. First, on the question of property, he argued that the
true owners of the letters were their recipients, rather than their
authors.135 And second, he sought to refute the idea of content
neutrality by claiming that the copyright statute was designed with
literary works in mind, which these letters could not be fairly said to
represent. The court’s decision responded to both points.136
While acknowledging that the Statute of Anne was designed for
“the encouragement of learning,” the court nevertheless refused to
make a distinction between a book of letters and “any other learned
work.”137 It offered no reason other than that such a distinction “would
be extremely mischievous.”138 On the property question, the court drew
a distinction between ownership of the physical letter and ownership of
its content, noting that it was only the latter that authorized
publication and which vested in the author.139 The opinion then
returned to the question of the statute and offered some additional
clarification on its conclusion that letters could obtain protection:
It is certain that no works have done more service to mankind, than those which have
appeared in this shape, upon familiar subjects, and which perhaps were never intended
to be published; and it is this makes them so valuable; for I must confess for my own part,
that letters which are very elaborately written, and originally intended for the press, are
generally the most insignificant, and very little worth any person’s reading.140

This is a peculiar but nevertheless important observation for our
purposes. What the court is suggesting is that the very fact that the
work at issue was intended to be kept private renders it in some ways
more worthy of protection as a learned work—perhaps because it
presents a more honest picture of the subject.141 What this observation
and the overall opinion reveal is a court that is on the one hand
unwilling to directly examine whether the Plaintiff suffered any specific

134. See Bernard L. Shientag, Lord Mansfield Revisited—A Modern Assessment, 10 FORDHAM
L. REV. 345, 354 n.35 (1941).
135. Pope, 26 Eng. Rep. at 608, 2 Atk. at 342.
136. Id., 2 Atk. at 342–43.
137. Id., 2 Atk. at 342.
138. Id., 2 Atk. at 342.
139. See id., 2 Atk. at 342.
140. Id., 2 Atk. at 343.
141. The law of evidence adopts a similar position, which is perhaps what the court was
alluding to. Modern evidence law considers contemporaneous written accounts of an event to
represent an exception to hearsay and as such makes them admissible when the declarant is
available to testify. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (setting forth the “Present Sense Impression”
exception).
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harm as a result of the publication, but on the other engaging with the
question of protectability by trying to show how letters are themselves
literary works in the spirit of that category.
The observation is particularly noteworthy because it appears to
be little more than dicta in the case, since Pope did not involve an
unpublished work at all.142 Contrary to some prominent misreadings of
the case,143 scholars have long noted that Pope involved the Plaintiff’s
assertion of a statutory copyright claim on the basis of an authorized
publication of the letters undertaken prior to the Defendant’s actions.144
Pope was therefore not a privative copyright case strictly speaking, even
though its observations about the value and protectability of letters
offer a theory for analogous privative claims.
Pope set forth the principle that letters were protectable subject
matter under statutory copyright. And soon enough additional cases
followed suit, most of which did indeed involve privative claims.145 And
whereas the Plaintiff and court in Pope had refrained from addressing
the objective content of the letters and the effects of its publication, later
litigants became more willing to use the private and potentially
embarrassing content of the letters to advance an objective view of the
harm that would accrue from its publication.
Perhaps the earliest privative copyright case was Thompson v.
Stanhope, where the Plaintiffs were the executors of a well-known
earl.146 Over the course of his lifetime, he corresponded extensively with
his son and in these letters “drew the characters of persons, and wrote
upon the subject of politics” in addition to a variety of other matters
intended as instruction for his son.147 When his son died, the earl
allowed the letters to remain in the possession of his widow, the
142. I am grateful to Professor Tomas Gomez-Arostegui for this point, and his generous
assistance with the original archival materials from the case.
143. The misreading of the case is pervasive and extends to both judicial opinions and
scholarly work examining the case. Much of the confusion appears to emanate from the manner in
which Pope brought about the prior publication of his letters. For characterizations of the case as
involving an unpublished work, see Donaldson v. Beckett (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 842; Millar v.
Taylor (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 221 & n.2; 4 Burr. 2303, 2340 & n.2; ISABELLA ALEXANDER,
COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 38–39 (2010); RONAN
DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY: CHARTING THE MOVEMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1695–1775) 73–74 (2004); and BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL
BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 12 n.6 (1999).
144. See, e.g., David J. Brennan, The Root of Title to Copyright in Works, 2015 INTELL. PROP.
Q. 289, 292–93 (noting that, surprisingly, the case was pleaded under the Statute of Anne and not
under a common law right).
145. See, e.g., Perceval v. Phipps (1813) 35 Eng. Rep. 225, 225; 2 Ves. & B. 19, 19 (dissolving
an injunction against publication of private letters); Granard v. Dunkin (1809) 1 Ball & Beat. 207
(Ir. Ch.) (granting an injunction against publication of private letters).
146. Thompson v. Stanhope (1774) 27 Eng. Rep. 467, 476; Amb. 737, 737.
147. Id., Amb. at 737.
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Defendant.148 Following the earl’s death, the widow sought to have the
letters published.149 The earl’s heirs objected, arguing that his intention
was always to have the letters destroyed after his death, and sought an
injunction.150 Implicit in their objection was that publication would
impact the public reputation and honor of the letters’ author, who had
always intended to keep them private for this reason. Without much
reasoning, the court granted the injunction.151 Pressed with the
argument that the letters contained valuable content that the public
deserved to see, the court “recommended it to the executors to permit
the publication, in case they saw no objection to the work upon reading
it.”152
Whereas Pope chose to remain completely agnostic to the content
of the Plaintiff’s letters and proceed on the mere recognition of the
letters as literary works, Thompson apparently acknowledged the
potentially embarrassing and personal nature of the content, but
almost completely outsourced that recognition to the Plaintiff without
any further scrutiny.
Privative copyright claims reached their fullest recognition a
short while later, in the case of Gee v. Pritchard,153 where the court was
asked to grapple with the sensitive nature of the expression involved.
The Defendant in the case was the stepson of the Plaintiff, and over the
course of his life had corresponded with the Plaintiff.154 In such
correspondence, the Plaintiff had often communicated matters “of a
private and confidential nature” to him “relating to his morals and
conduct in life.”155 When they had a falling out, the Defendant
threatened to publish the correspondence, which the Plaintiff contested
as a “violation of [her] right and interest” and noted that it was
“intended to wound her feelings.”156 On this basis, she sought an
injunction.
What is interesting about the case is that it is reported as a
colloquy between the court and the Plaintiff, wherein the court appears
to be searching for an appropriate basis on which to afford relief. Early
on in the argument, the court rejects the Plaintiff’s argument about
hurt feelings, noting that “the continuance or the discontinuance of [a]
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id., Amb. at 737.
Id., Amb. at 737.
Id., Amb. at 738.
Id. at 477, Amb. at 740.
Id., Amb. at 740.
Gee v. Pritchard (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670; 2 Swans. 403.
See id. at 670, 2 Swans. at 403.
Id., 2 Swans. at 403–04.
Id. at 671, 2 Swans. at 405.
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friendship” can form no basis for the relief.157 While expressing some
limited skepticism about the principle, the court nevertheless concluded
that letters were legitimate literary works and could qualify for
protection as property, which would entitle the Plaintiff to an
injunction.158 All the same, the argument about “feelings” was not
completely irrelevant, as it triggered the following observation from the
court:
I do not say that I am to interfere because the letters are written in confidence, or because
the publication of them may wound the feelings of the Plaintiff; but if mischievous effects
of that kind can be apprehended in cases in which this Court has been accustomed, on the
ground of property, to forbid publication, it would not become me to abandon the
jurisdiction which my predecessors have exercised, and refuse to forbid it.159

While intriguing, the court’s language has been the subject of
significant interpretive disagreement ever since.160 It is rooted in the
distinction between law and equity, which soon became defunct.161
Premised on the idea that “equity follows the law,” courts of equity often
required proof of a right at law before they would interfere and grant
relief.162 The court appears to be advancing the argument that although
the Plaintiff’s subjective assessment of dignitary harm cannot form the
jurisdictional basis of its intervention, it may nevertheless be the basis
for the court’s relief once such jurisdiction is established on the basis of
“property”—that is, copyright. Warren and Brandeis saw in Gee a move
toward recognizing wounded feelings as the basis for its intervention,
which is obviously incorrect.163 Instead, the court drew a distinction
between the basis of its jurisdiction for intervention and the Plaintiff’s
157. Id. at 674, 2 Swans. at 413.
158. See id., 2 Swans. at 414.
159. Id. at 678; 2 Swans. at 426.
160. See W.B.G., Note and Comment, A Re-interpretation of Gee v. Pritchard, 25 MICH. L. REV.
889 (1927) (arguing Gee has been misunderstood and does not in fact stand for the idea that “the
office and jurisdiction of equity[,] unless enlarged by express statute[,] are limited to the protection
of rights of property”). See generally MEGAN RICHARDSON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: ORIGINS AND
INFLUENCE OF A NINETEENTH-CENTURY IDEA 27–28 (2017) (“[G]iven the circumstances of this
case, . . . it might be argued that breach of confidence was the more appropriate doctrine for the
protection of privacy . . . .”).
161. For an account of the law/equity distinction and its origins see F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY:
A COURSE OF LECTURES (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 2d ed. 1936) (1909) (offering an
extensive analysis of equity); and S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW
74–87 (1969) (discussing the rise of early equity in England). For an account of the law/equity
merger and its effects, see Andrew Burrows, We Do This at Common Law but That in Equity, 22
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002).
162. For an account of this maxim and its application, see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Does Equity
Follow the Law of Torts?, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1926).
163. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 93, at 200–05 (arguing that the court’s use of property
was a stand-in for privacy concerns). For a criticism of this interpretation, see W.B.G., supra note
160, at 890 (“[N]aturally both court and counsel would be searching for the right and threatened
tort in the field of property.”).
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reasons for seeking relief.164 Authorial property justified the former, the
Plaintiff’s subjective claim of dignitary harm the latter.
The court’s refusal to fully engage the nature of the “feelings”
and the specific nature of harm likely to accrue from the publication of
the work may be partially explained by a rule that prevailed at the time,
which denied both common law and statutory copyright protection for
works that were unlawful or immoral.165 Lord Eldon, the author of the
opinion in Gee, had in the year before decided another well-known case
involving the right of first publication; in that case, the Plaintiff had
transmitted the manuscript of a libelous poem to the Defendant with
the intention of publishing it, but the Plaintiff ultimately changed his
mind before its publication.166 When the Defendant nevertheless went
ahead and published it, the Plaintiff sought an injunction, claiming a
violation of his right.167 Lord Eldon denied the relief on the basis that
the Plaintiff’s very right was in question because the work was not
“innocent.”168 Consequently, a fuller investigation into the nature of the
Plaintiff’s dignitary interest in privative copyright cases would have
had courts running into considerations of libel, morality, and bad faith,
which would have sullied the nature of the right at issue and
undermined their jurisdiction. It is perhaps for this reason that Lord
Eldon himself is fairly cryptic in Gee about the nature of the feelings at
issue, an approach that would cement the subjective nature of the harm
involved in such cases.
The broadest—and most controversial—expansion of privative
copyright claims was to come a few years later, in the celebrated case of
Prince Albert v. Strange.169 The case cemented the basis for a court’s
intervention on a subjective conception of dignitary harm but made the
further move toward identifying a distinctive privacy interest. The case
involved drawings and etchings that the Queen and her husband were
in the practice of making as a hobby for their amusement.170 These
drawings were “of subjects of private and domestic interest to
themselves” and, to ensure their privacy, the couple took great pains to
have them printed by a private press and retained possession of the

164. See W.B.G., supra note 160, at 890 (“Criminal libel was suggested and promptly rejected
on the familiar principle that equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin the commission of crimes.”).
165. EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE COMMON LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL
PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES: EMBRACING COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF
LITERATURE AND ART, AND PLAYRIGHT IN DRAMATIC AND MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS 112–13 (1879).
166. Southey v. Sherwood (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1006–07; 2 Mer. 435, 435–37.
167. Id. at 1006; 2 Mer. at 435–36.
168. Id. at 1007; 2 Mer. at 437–38.
169. (1849) 41 Eng. Rep. 1171; 1 Mac. & G. 25.
170. Id. at 1172; 1 Mac. & G. at 26.
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plates themselves.171 Somehow the drawings got into the hands of the
Defendant, who proposed to hold a public exhibition showcasing them
and, to that end, printed a catalogue describing all the works that were
to be exhibited.172 The Plaintiffs took exception to this and sought an
injunction.173
In its opinion, the court considered it wholly unexceptional that
the work at issue was a work of art—rather than a literary work—and
readily acknowledged the Plaintiff’s right.174 The principal basis of the
Plaintiff’s argument rested on the “right to determine whether [to]
publish [the work] or not,” that is, the “right to the first publication,” to
which the court acceded.175 Yet, the court went one step further. It held
that the Defendant’s catalogue was nothing more than “a means of
communicating knowledge and information of the original,” which
would harm the Plaintiff’s personal interests just as much, and
accordingly enjoined the publication and distribution of the catalogue
as well.176 While this extension of protection heralded the onset of a
separate privacy interest in the common law, it also had the effect of
conflating the dignitary interest underlying the Plaintiff’s copyright
claim, which was rooted in both representational and authorial
autonomy, unlike the privacy claim that sounded in personal autonomy.
Nevertheless, for our purposes, Prince Albert suggests that by
the mid-nineteenth century, privative copyright claims had become
largely unexceptional, especially at equity where the relief sought was
an injunction. The court’s statement that “[t]he property of an author
or composer of any work, whether of literature, art, or science, in such
work unpublished and kept for his private use or pleasure, cannot be
disputed” is telling in this regard.177 Not only was it now irrelevant
whether the work qualified for protection under the statute, but the law
had grown perfectly content with assuming the existence of a dignitary
interest based on the plaintiffs’ assertions and deferring to them on the
question. This eventually got turned into the right of first publication,
specifically for unpublished works.
The early development of privative copyright claims highlights
a few things. First, courts’ principal concern in these cases—at least
initially—centered around whether the works at issue could qualify as
protectable subject matter under the terms of the statute. They readily
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.; 1 Mac. & G. at 26–27.
Id. at 1172–73; 1 Mac. & G. at 28–29.
Id.; 1 Mac. & G. at 28–29.
Id. at 1174; 1 Mac. & G. at 33.
Id. at 1176; 1 Mac. & G. at 37.
Id. at 1178; 1 Mac. & G. at 43.
Id.; 1 Mac. & G. at 42.
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answered this in the affirmative by denying the need for any scrutiny
of the work’s substantive merits, a position that would continue well
into the future. (A secondary concern was the extent to which a
plaintiff’s claim had been abandoned by virtue of the limited or private
communication of the content, for which they relied on the distinction
between possessory and incorporeal property.) Second, while courts
recognized the dignitary nature of plaintiffs’ motivations, they did no
more than suggest that these concerns were legitimate and consciously
avoided any deeper examination of their credibility. In so accepting a
subjective version of the plaintiff’s account of harm, they were likely
avoiding getting entangled in the domestic affairs of the litigants, many
of whom were prominent personalities at the time, or in the complex
interplay between copyright, libel, morality, and public policy. It also
had the effect of allowing them to proceed using the formal language of
the law without having to make any special exceptions for the nature of
the interest at issue. This, in turn, allowed the domain of privative
claims to expand beyond just literary works, to other categories where
the plaintiff asserted similar motivations and showed the existence of a
valid right. Third, and finally, an overwhelming majority of these cases
were brought at equity, since the plaintiff was seeking an injunction.
This enabled the court to exercise a greater degree of flexibility and
discretion in molding the bases for its jurisdiction and interference in
the case.
B. Early American Law
The first U.S. copyright statute, the Act of 1790, was modeled in
large part on the Statute of Anne.178 The earliest reported privative
copyright claim was brought shortly after, in 1811, and adopted a
noticeably different approach from its English counterparts.179 While it
relied on English precedents for its position, the court openly embraced
a more objective approach to the dignitary interest at issue.180
The case of Denis v. LeClerc illustrates this objective
approach.181 The facts involved a letter written by the Plaintiff to a lady
wherein he sought to “pay[ ] his addresses” to her, that is, he attempted

178. Compare 1 Stat. 124 (1790), with Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Ann. c. 21 (Eng.) (repealed
1842).
179. Denis v. LeClerc, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 297 (Orleans 1811).
180. Id. at 305 (“A defendant is not to be enjoined from doing an act, on account of the benefit
which he expects to derive therefrom, but on account of the injury which it may occasion to the
plaintiff.”).
181. Id.
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to court her.182 The content of the letter was therefore obviously private
and potentially embarrassing. The Defendant, through means
unknown, obtained copies of the letter and sought to publish it, to which
the Plaintiff objected.183 At first, the Plaintiff obtained an injunction.184
In his answer to the injunction, the Defendant annexed a copy of the
letter and filed it in the office of court clerk, after which he advertised
publicly that others interested in reading the letter might do so by
visiting the clerk’s office.185 The Plaintiff then approached the court
again, seeking to hold the Defendant in contempt.186 The court obliged
in an elaborate opinion.
The court initially described the relevant English authorities to
confirm the validity of the Plaintiff’s right to the injunction.187
Interestingly enough, the Defendant attempted to distinguish these
authorities by pointing out that whereas the defendants in those cases
had all been seeking to publish the letters at issue and thereby seek a
profit, he had clear nonmonetary reasons for his actions in that he was
doing so “with the sole view of disclosing the writer’s secrets and
wounding his feelings.”188 The court found this argument to be of no
consequence, but instead to even more strongly favor the Plaintiff’s
right.189 Additionally, this concession by the Defendant allowed the
court to venture into the nature of the harm that the Defendant was
attempting to bring about, which required a closer examination of the
work itself.190
Canvassing a whole set of French, English, and Roman authors
on the ethics and morality of publishing private correspondence, the
court observed that when letters were “written with mystery and
contain[ed] confidential things,” the wrong from revealing their content
was even “greater when the secret of a letter is unveiled with the only
design of DOING AN INJURY to the writer.”191 The Plaintiff’s effort to
“open his heart, without any apprehension of that being revealed” in his
letter, which was covered in “mystery and confidence,” was worthy of
additional protection from the Defendant’s public actions, which were

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 312.
Id. at 318.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 300–05.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 305–06.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 310.

2020]

PRIVATIVE COPYRIGHT

47

entirely to “vex the plaintiff.”192 And thus the court adopted an overtly
objective approach toward the Plaintiff’s dignitary interest and the
corresponding disseminative harm through a closer examination of the
contents of the letter and the Defendant’s motives in publicizing it. In
so doing, it unwittingly broke with prior English precedents.193
While early American cases approvingly cited and relied on
English precedents for their principles, they at the same time went out
of their way to add more justificatory content for their holdings. This is
in clear contrast to their English counterparts, which were tersely
worded and often structured using the language of formal rules and
principles. In so doing, American courts often unknowingly deviated
from English law. Much of this appears to have also been influenced by
prominent legal treatise writers, many of whom were deeply influential
in the jurisprudence of the time.194
Joseph Story, for instance, in his classic work on equity, devoted
an entire section to understanding how courts of equity approached the
issue of injunctions in cases involving the publication of private
letters.195 While he drew from the finite set of English precedents, he
attempted to synthesize them using rational principles. This synthesis
added a gloss that was hardly appreciated at the time. Unlike any of
the English cases, Story offered a rationale for protecting the
publication of private letters:
In a moral view, the publication of such letters . . . is perhaps one of the most odious
breaches of private confidence, of social duty, and of honorable feelings, which can well be
imagined. It strikes at the root of all that free and mutual interchange of advice, opinions,
and sentiments, between relatives and friends, and correspondents, which is so essential
to the well-being of society, and to the spirit of a liberal courtesy and refinement. It may
involve whole families in great distress, from the public display of facts and
circumstances, which were reposed in the bosoms of others under the deepest and most
affecting confidence, that they should for ever remain inviolable secrets.196

192. Id. at 310, 312.
193. As an apparent last effort, the Defendant in Denis also raised the argument that the
injunction impeded the “freedom of the press” embodied in the First Amendment. Id. at 313–14.
Again, the court rejected this argument with the observation that an open-ended claim of this sort
would mean that any “propagation” of a slander or libel would remain nonactionable. Id. at 315.
It then entered a judgment for the Plaintiff, found the Defendant to be in contempt, and imposed
a monetary fine on the Defendant in addition to ordering that he be imprisoned for “ten days”
owing to the contempt. Id. at 313–15, 321.
194. For the authoritative account of this, see A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal
Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 668–74 (1981)
(describing the contrasting influence and growth of American legal treatises and their English
counterparts).
195. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 946 (11th ed. 1873).
196. Id. § 946.
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Story thus offered a theory of harm for copyright law’s
intervention in such instances. While his account of harm encompassed
disseminative harm—of a private nature—it also interestingly adopted
a collectivist mindset. In other words, the harm was not just the actual
effect on the plaintiff-author, but additionally the effect on the fabric of
society as a whole, since it would alter the form and nature of individual
communications as a result. Of course, not all legal treatises were this
forceful; some merely offered an account of English precedents.197
But Story’s account formed the basis for the court’s intervention
in the 1855 New York case of Woolsey v. Judd, regarded as having
settled the question of copyright protection for private letters under
American law.198 The case also cemented the legitimacy of privative
copyright claims. The Defendant in Woolsey was the editor of a local
newspaper who had come into possession of a few private letters written
by the Plaintiff and sought to publish them.199 His motive was “fixing
upon the plaintiff . . . the imputation of being the authors or instigators
of certain anonymous and abusive publications, relative to a religious
society.”200
The court began its elaborate and wordy opinion by first noting
that the Copyright Act of 1831 specifically empowered courts to grant
injunctions to “restrain the publication” of a work sought to be
published “without the consent of the author.”201 It then canvassed the
English authorities in exquisite detail to confirm the existence of the
Plaintiff’s right qua author of the letters.202 Relying on Story’s
exposition, the court agreed that the basis for its intervention needed
to be an actual legal property right, and not just the possibility of harm
to the Plaintiff from the publication.203 The basis of this right was in the
court’s view just like the ordinary rights of chattel ownership. Just as
an artist who produces “a painting [that is] a wretched daub” or a
“statue [that is] a lamentable abortion” has the right to prevent “its
public exhibition” against his will, which would “disgrace the artist,”
the same would apply to literary property.204 According to the court, the
nature of this right was “absolute,” in that ensuring the
nondissemination of the work was a viable basis for relief.205 “As owner,
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 98, at 89–100.
11 How. Pr. 49, 53–54 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855).
Id. at 49–51.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 51–52.
Id. at 54–79.
Id. at 53–55.
Id. at 57.
Id.at 58.
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he has an absolute right to suppress as well as to publish; and he is as
fully entitled to the protection and aid of the court, when suppression is
his sole and averred object, as when he intends to publish.”206
The Woolsey court went to great lengths to distance the basis of
copyright protection in the Plaintiff’s work from any need to show either
market significance or literary merit. Neither “intended publication”
nor “pecuniary value” were requirements for protection as
copyrightable subject matter, in the court’s view.207 The court also
rejected any scrutiny of the substance of the work for its “intrinsic
merits,” so as to connect it to the Plaintiff’s basis for suppressing it.208
A related move seen in the opinion is the court’s effort to
distance the Plaintiff’s attempt to suppress the work—that is, its
privative nature—from what is often described as the right of first
publication.209 As an affirmative right, the right of first publication
entitles the author to determine when and how to publish the work.210
Yet, as an analytical matter, it appears premised on the existence of an
intention to publish the work, which could be taken to imply that when
the author openly disavows such an intention, the right disappears.211
Early English case law on the right of first publication had largely
involved pecuniary motives on the part of either or both plaintiffs and
defendants.212 To the Woolsey court, the two were analytically distinct,
even if considered sides of the same coin. The right in the unpublished
letters was the right “to control the act of publication, and, in the
exercise of his own discretion, to decide whether there shall be any
publication at all.”213 To equate the two would be to deny “that the
writer has any title to relief at all, when his object is not to publish, but
[to] suppress.”214
In settling a host of interpretive questions surrounding
unpublished letters, Woolsey also confirmed the place of privative
copyright claims under American copyright law. And it did so not just
as a matter of common law copyright, but as an interpretation of the
federal statute and its allowance for an injunction to restrain an

206. Id.
207. Id. at 70.
208. Id. at 71–72.
209. For an excellent account of the right of first publication, see Jake Linford, A Second Look
at the Right of First Publication, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 585 (2011).
210. Id. at 586.
211. Of course, this was incorrect analytically, as understood today. See Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 553 (1985).
212. See Linford, supra note 209, at 597–600 (examining the case law).
213. Woolsey, 11 How. Pr. at 72.
214. Id.
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unauthorized publication. Perhaps most importantly, though, in
seeking to strengthen the independent analytical basis of the plaintiff’s
right, which it described as “absolute” and “unlimited,” the court
effectively returned the law of privative copyright claims back to relying
on a purely subjective conception of harm.215 Indeed, in some respects,
Woolsey went beyond the English precedents insofar as it consciously
allowed for the possibility that the plaintiff might have no verifiable
reason for the exercise of her right through the claim. Such a possibility
would nevertheless enable the court to move forward on a presumption
of some reason since the law was to concern itself with no more than
the bare existence of the right. Later courts adopted the logic of Woolsey
and maintained its adherence to an absolute conception of the right,
which would entitle the plaintiff to suppress the work for any reason,
without inviting the court’s scrutiny of the particular harm being
complained of.216
Early American jurisprudence on privative copyright claims
built on English doctrine and in so doing, synthesized, rationalized, and
justified the analytical basis of these claims. While American courts as
a whole took the nature of the plaintiff’s dignitary interest and
corresponding disseminative harm much more seriously in their actual
exposition of the case and their rationalization of claims therein, they
at the same time sought to distance the legal doctrine itself from being
contingent on proof of such disseminative harm, preferring instead to
validate the outcome in the formal doctrinal concepts of property
(ownership or title) and tort (wrong). This latter move was but a
reflection of an approach to legal reasoning that dominated at the time,
but it had the effect of cementing the legitimacy of privative copyright
claims by allowing disseminative harm to flourish as an independent—
yet unstated and unexamined—category of harms that could
legitimately form the basis for a plaintiff’s copyright claim. This
expository aspect of harm highlights an important transition in the
development of privative copyright claims: it moved the doctrine away
from the domain of damnum sine injuria (harm without an actionable
injury) but not quite into the territory of injuria sine damno (an
actionable injury without proof or verification of harm).217 That latter
move towards injuria sine damno occurred in the modern era, as
215. See id. at 58.
216. See, e.g., Barrett v. Fish, 47 A. 174, 175 (Vt. 1899) (“Such protection is based solely on the
property of the writer or possessor of such letters therein.”); Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2
Bush) 480, 488–89 (1867) (“[Publication] by the act of the recipient would be an infringement of
the author’s exclusive right, which he may prevent by injunction.”).
217. For a fuller account of the distinction, see HERBERT BROOM, COMMENTARIES ON THE
COMMON LAW: DESIGNED AS AN INTRODUCTORY TO ITS STUDY 75–86 (4th ed. 1873).
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copyright law became heavily statutory, and with it judicial decisions
on the topic became less expository and more interpretive.
C. Modern Federal Copyright Law
The Copyright Act of 1909 was Congress’s first major foray into
an omnibus revision of the copyright statute.218 Despite attempting to
federalize significant parts of copyright law, it nevertheless chose to
allow state common law protection for literary works to subsist in
tandem. This bifurcation revolved around the idea of “publication.” The
act of publication caused a work to lose its common law protection and
potentially obtain federal statutory protection (subject to certain other
conditions).219 Unpublished works retained their common law
protection under state laws.
The Act of 1909 expressly preserved common law protection by
providing that its provisions were not to be construed “to annul or limit
the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common
law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such
unpublished work without his consent.”220 Notable in this preservation
was the reference to equity and the fact that the right extended to
preventing the unauthorized “use” of the work.
The language of the 1909 Act cemented the legitimacy of
privative copyright claims. The works underlying such claims (for
example, letters) were given an overtly neutral classification as
“unpublished works,” and the absolute nature of the right at issue was
statutorily recognized by granting its author or owner the exclusive
right to use the work. Of course, since the provision of the Act merely
preserved existing law, it never formed the basis of courts’ continued
recognition of privative copyright claims.
For the most part, courts continued to apply a subjective
approach to the content of the works and the disseminative harm being
alleged by the plaintiff. Instead of seeking to derive the logic for
privative claims in the individualized nature of the work and the
dignitary interest at issue, they looked to principles of labor instead as
justifying a claim of ownership. In Baker v. Libbie, a case decided by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the Plaintiff sought an
injunction to restrain the publication of a private unpublished letter.221
218. Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (repealed 1976).
219. For a general overview, see Benjamin Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The
Question of Phonograph Records, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 469–70 (1955); Melville B. Nimmer,
Copyright Publication, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 185, 185 (1956).
220. Copyright Act of 1909 § 2, 35 Stat. at 1076.
221. 97 N.E. 109, 109 (Mass. 1912).
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Looking to both English and American authorities, the court considered
the question of protectability settled and granted the Plaintiff’s
request.222 The basis of this right, to the Court, was a matter of principle
since “[t]he labor of composing letters for private and familiar
correspondence may be trifling, or it may be severe, but it is none the
less the result of an expenditure of thought and time” and “[t]he market
value of such an effort may be measured by the opinions of others, but
the fact of property is not created thereby.”223
What is also intriguing about the opinion is the court’s express
recognition that it did not need to scrutinize the Plaintiff’s motives for
the action, or the underlying basis for the harm. In seeking to examine
the nature of the right at issue, the court noted that some kinds of
letters—those
of
“extreme
affection and
other
fiduciary
224
communications”—may imply an obligation of secrecy. Yet, the court
observed: “This case does not involve personal feelings or what has been
termed the right to privacy . . . [since] there appears to be nothing about
these letters, knowledge of which by strangers would violate even
delicate feelings.”225 Taken in isolation, these comments may suggest
the court’s adoption of an objective approach to the disseminative harm;
yet when viewed entirely as part of the court’s dicta, handed down after
its finding for the Plaintiff without any basis other than ownership, it
suggests something else. It instead reveals the court’s efforts to distance
the Plaintiff’s invocation of literary property, that is, common law
copyright, from the “right to privacy” as a stand-alone cause as
advocated by Warren and Brandeis in their article, which the court
readily cited.226 The court’s solution to bifurcate privative copyright
claims from privacy claims was an attempt to situate the latter as
entailing wounded feelings, while limiting the former to an account of
ownership. And yet, ownership was not an economically driven
argument, but instead one justified by labor and the individualized
effort put into the creation.
Other courts were less ambitious in this regard and preferred to
adopt the formal rule of ownership without any discussion of the
underlying content in the letter.227 This is not to suggest that courts

222. Id. at 112.
223. Id. at 111.
224. Id. at 112.
225. Id. (citations omitted).
226. Id.
227. See, e.g., Ipswich Mills v. Dillon, 157 N.E. 604, 606 (Mass. 1927) (“The original letters
from the plaintiff to the defendants belonged to the defendants. They were the recipients, and
therefore owned them.”); King v. King, 168 P. 730, 732 (Wyo. 1917) (“[T]he holding generally has

2020]

PRIVATIVE COPYRIGHT

53

altogether ignored the content at issue. To the contrary, when called on
to examine the content—either by the plaintiff or by the defendant’s
attempted reliance on an exception to the traditional principles of
ownership—courts engaged in that task and on occasion denied the
claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s
decision in Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. International Magazine Co.
is illustrative.228 Called on to intervene and grant an injunction against
the Defendant’s attempt to publish a letter that would reveal the inner
workings of the Plaintiff organization and discourage membership, the
court refused; it concluded instead that the letter appeared to be “an
instrument or means for the accomplishment of some unlawful purpose
or object,” which could not form the basis of the court’s equitable
intervention.229
The comprehensive codification of copyright that occurred in
1976 changed most of what had transpired in relation to privative
copyright claims under the common law. Whereas prior copyright
statutes had revolved around the act of “publication,” thereby creating
a bifurcated system wherein unpublished works obtained protection
under common law copyright and published works under the statute,
the 1976 Act eliminated the centrality of publication altogether. In its
place, it introduced the idea of “fixation,” under which any original work
of authorship that was fixed in a medium of expression became eligible
for copyright from the moment of such fixation.230 The obvious result
was that works that had been the basis of privative claims under
common law copyright now became eligible for statutory copyright
protection. The Act also incorporated the right of first publication,
which had formed the basis of privative copyright claims at common
law, into the exclusive distribution right.231
However, the most significant effect on privative claims from the
codification and merger of the two systems was undoubtedly the
availability of the fair use doctrine to defendants. The fair use doctrine
can exempt defendants from copyright infringement; it entails
scrutinizing various factors relating to the work at issue, the
defendant’s use of it, and the related effects of such usage.232 Developed
by Justice Story in the mid-nineteenth-century decision of Folsom v.

been . . . that . . . [the receiver] has the right of possession and property in the paper and
parchment, but the property in the contents for the purpose of publication . . . is in the author.”).
228. 294 F. 661 (2d Cir. 1923).
229. Id. at 663.
230. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52–53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665–66.
231. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61–62, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5675.
232. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64–66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N at 5678–79.
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Marsh,233 the doctrine came to be understood as a defense to statutory
copyright infringement actions.234 Indeed, no reported common law
copyright decision invoked the doctrine. The 1976 Act for the first time
codified—albeit as a common law restatement—the fair use doctrine.235
But in eliminating common law copyright for fixed, yet unpublished,
works, it subjected an entirely new set of works to the doctrine for the
first time.
Unsurprisingly, courts initially struggled to make sense of the
fair use defense in relation to unpublished works. In Harper & Row, a
case involving an unpublished work (though not a privative claim), the
Supreme Court equivocated on the extent to which the unpublished
nature of the work influenced fair use, eventually concluding that the
unpublished nature disfavored fair use.236 The best known intersection
of fair use and privative claims occurred a few years later in the Second
Circuit’s decision in Salinger v. Random House, Inc.237 The case
involved personal letters written by the reclusive novelist J.D. Salinger,
which had fallen into the hands of a biographer, Ian Hamilton.238
Hamilton, who was working on a biography of Salinger, chose to quote
from them and paraphrase them rather extensively in the book.239
When Salinger learned of this, he objected to the biography’s reliance
on his unpublished letters and commenced an action for copyright
infringement.240 The Defendant in turn asserted fair use as a defense.241
The district court found for the Defendant, applying the fair use
doctrine without any modification to the works at issue.242 On appeal,
the Second Circuit reversed.
In a well-known opinion authored by Judge Newman, the court
concluded that “special weight” had to be accorded to the fact that the

233. 9 F. Cas. 342, 345–49 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
234. As has been shown, Story quite consciously conflated common law and statutory copyright
in his reasoning in Folsom. See L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 431, 436–37 (1998) (“Story thus disregarded the distinction between the common law
copyright and the statutory copyright.”).
235. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680 (“Beyond a very
broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts
must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.”).
236. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985) (noting
that if a plaintiff’s work is unpublished, courts are more reluctant to accept a fair use defense, but
that it is not an “absolute rule” and may be “tempered in practice by the equitable nature of the
fair use doctrine”).
237. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
238. Id. at 92–93.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 92–94.
241. Id. at 94.
242. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413, 423–26 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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work was unpublished.243 Using this rubric and analyzing the facts
through the various fair use factors, the court found there to be no fair
use.244 Judge Newman’s opinion seemingly sought to give implicit effect
to privacy considerations through the language and structure of fair
use.245 Particularly salient was the court’s observation that
unpublished works “normally enjoy complete protection against copying
any protected expression.”246 A later opinion of the same court
reiterated this position, effectively placing unpublished works—and
privative claims—on a pedestal seemingly beyond the reach of fair
use.247 These developments prompted Congress to intervene in 1992
because it was worried that the fair use doctrine would cease to have
any application to unpublished works.248 It amended the fair use
provision in the 1976 Act to provide that “[t]he fact that a work is
unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is
made upon consideration of all the above factors.”249
The amendment resulted in fair use being asserted on a regular
basis against privative copyright claims, and with a good degree of
success. On the rare occasion that plaintiffs prevailed in this balancing,
courts nevertheless went out of their way to emphasize that they were
not giving effect to the plaintiff’s privacy interests, but instead limiting
themselves to copyright, as though this was not obvious.
All the same, when courts allowed the fair use claim to succeed,
they placed significant reliance on the absence of any provable harm
(actual or potential) to the market for the plaintiff’s work from the
defendant’s actions—the well-known fourth fair use factor.250
Examining the existence (or absence) of market harm for privative
copyright claims is an obvious mismatch, something that courts seem
unwilling to recognize in their commitment to copyright’s utilitarian
goals. In recent work, one scholar has described this as courts’ use of
“market gibberish” to mask other considerations.251
Regardless of courts’ reasons for this market-oriented move, it
nevertheless had the long-term effect of deterring privative copyright
claims being brought as privative claims, that is, with an overt

243. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96.
244. See id. at 100.
245. For evidence of this impulse, see Newman, supra note 5, at 460 & n.2.
246. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97.
247. See New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 583–84 (2d Cir. 1989).
248. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-836 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553.
249. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012).
250. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“[T]he effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.”).
251. See Gilden, supra note 65.

56

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1:1

assertion of disseminative harm, whenever a fair use defense was
plausible. This trend continues to this day. Plaintiffs instead prefer to
assert—and indeed sympathetic courts are willing to infer—some kind
of market harm, even if only to a licensing market, purely in order to
get around courts’ myopic construction of the fair use doctrine. The
fairly recent Ninth Circuit decision in Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc.
is a perfect example of this phenomenon.252
The Plaintiffs in the case were a well-known pop music star and
her manager, who got married in secret.253 In order to maintain the
secrecy of the wedding, the couple limited the number of witnesses and
took a very limited number of photographs, which “were intended for
the couple’s private use.”254 Through unscrupulous means, the
photographs fell into the hands of an individual who sold them to the
Defendant, a gossip magazine that published them.255 The district court
found for the Defendant, concluding that the publisher’s use of the
photographs constituted fair use.256 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed, in a rare denial of fair use for a privative claim.257
The court’s decision was predicated on an analysis of the four
fair use factors.258 On the first factor, the nature of the protected work,
the court placed extraordinary emphasis on the unpublished nature of
the work.259 Describing this fact as a “critical element,” the court found
it to weigh in favor of the Plaintiffs.260 On the second factor, the amount
and substantiality of the copying, the court was swayed by the fact that
the Defendant published all six of the wedding photographs that it
received.261 In the court’s words, the “use was not just substantial, it
was total,” which “weigh[ed] decisively against fair use.”262 Yet, it was
the fourth factor that would make a difference, since in the court’s own
view, it was “the single most important element of fair use.”263 On this
factor, the district court had taken the view criticized above—that there
was no market harm since the Plaintiffs did not intend to publish and

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
(1985)).

688 F.3d 1164, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1168–69.
Id. at 1168–69.
Id. at 1169.
Id. at 1168.
Id. at 1183–84.
Id. at 1183.
See id. at 1177–78.
Id. at 1177–78.
Id. at 1179.
Id. at 1178–80.
Id. at 1180 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566
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distribute the photographs.264 The Ninth Circuit concluded that there
was in fact “an actual market” for the photos.265 This market was
presumed to exist because the couple was “in the business of selling
images of themselves and they ha[d] done so in the past.”266 The
Defendant’s actions lowered the “demand for the pictures in the actual
market” which weighed against fair use.267
It is the court’s reasoning on this last factor that is most
puzzling. By the court’s own admission, the Plaintiffs’ primary (if not
exclusive) motivation in retaining the photographs as unpublished was
the intended “secrecy” and “private use.”268 Such secrecy no doubt has
a potential price—in that the scarcity renders the information more
valuable. Yet, to use that fact to presume an actual market for the work
remains something of a stretch. In the end, what the court was
undoubtedly motivated by was the private nature of the work at issue,
seen in the court’s discussion of the embarrassment that the Plaintiffs
suffered upon the public revelation of their marriage.269 Despite the
majority opinion’s sympathy for the couple, its failure to understand the
nature of the dignitary interest involved did more harm than good for
privative copyright claims. Judge McKeown’s observation, albeit in
dicta, that a celebrity’s private messages to another somehow render
the message nonprivate and therefore unprotected under copyright
law’s distribution and display rights, showcases this failure.270 The
court’s unfortunate reasoning was, however, a mere representation of
how the fair use doctrine has come to be understood by courts and
misapplied in relation to privative copyright claims.
A more plausible (and analytically defensible) application of the
fair use doctrine to privative claims, such as the one in Monge, would
have entailed treating the fourth fair use factor as largely unhelpful in
the context of claims driven by disseminative harm. This would have
allowed the court to focus on the other factors, including the
unpublished nature of the work, which might have produced the same
outcome but on a firmer footing.

264. Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., No. CV 09-5077-R, 2010 WL 3835053, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 30, 2010) (“The fourth factor weighs in favor of fair use because the publication did not usurp
a market that properly belonged to the Plaintiffs because no such market existed.”).
265. Monge, 688 F.3d at 1181.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1181–83.
268. Id. at 1169.
269. See id. (describing, for example, Monge’s husband getting “berat[ed]” by his mother, from
whom he had kept the marriage a secret).
270. Id. at 1175 n.8 (arguing that celebrities who sent photos by text message had published
them and thus eliminated their interest in keeping the message private).
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The dissenting opinion in the case offered an even more
problematic approach to the fourth fair use factor. According to the
dissent, since the Plaintiffs had evidenced a clear intention to keep the
work secret and never publish it, the facts revealed a “market failure”
that required finding the fourth fair use factor in favor of the
Defendant.271 In the dissent’s view, the refusal to publish was motivated
by “a desire unrelated to the goals of copyright,” since it was not market
related.272 Implicit in this framing was the idea that noneconomic
considerations such as those at the heart of privative claims were
irrelevant to copyright. For this proposition, the dissent relied on a wellknown law review article on fair use and market failure.273 Yet, it failed
to note the author’s clear statement therein that “fair use should not be
used to force disclosure of works that the author has heretofore kept
secret.”274
The court’s opinion in Monge is hardly unique in its failure to
reflect on the obvious mismatch between fair use and privative claims.
Prior courts, including district courts, have encountered the same
predicament, and some have even gone so far as to call out the anomaly
and suggest reforms. In Lish v. Harper’s Magazine Foundation, the
Plaintiff was a well-known fiction writer who brought an infringement
action against a newspaper that published his letter to prospective
students without his consent.275 The newspaper made editorial
revisions to the letter and made it seem as though the edited version
had been authored by the Plaintiff, but thereafter used the editing to
claim fair use of the letter.276
Despite never having published or marketed a letter before, the
Plaintiff argued that the Defendant’s unauthorized publication affected
the actual and potential market value of the work.277 The court saw
through this and rejected the argument, finding there to be no market
effect—present or potential—from the publication.278 Yet, in so doing
the court cast doubt on the singular importance of the fourth fair use

271. Id. at 1192 (Smith, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 1191–92 (quoting Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d
1110, 1119 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000)).
273. Id. Judge Smith excerpted language from a prior Ninth Circuit opinion that quoted
Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax
Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1634 (1982).
274. Gordon, supra note 273, at 1634 n.191.
275. 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1092–93 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
276. Id. at 1095–96.
277. Id. at 1103–04.
278. Id. at 1104.
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factor as interpreted by some courts.279 In direct response to the
Defendant’s assertion that the noneconomic nature of the Plaintiff’s
work suggested weaker copyright protection and correlated to a clearer
fair use argument, the court made clear that “providing economic
incentives for the creation of works of art is not necessarily the only
value which the fair use doctrine embodies or protects.”280
The Lish opinion is an interesting and bold recognition of the
mismatch between the dominant incentives-based understanding of
copyright under the 1976 Act and the nature of interests and
motivations involved in privative copyright claims. All the same, it
highlights the state of privative claims under modern copyright
doctrine. Due to the utilitarian emphasis in current law, plaintiffauthors bringing these claims consciously mask the nature of the
dignitary interest involved in the claim instead of highlighting it. When
presented with a defense of fair use and its overt need for a showing of
market harm—or its absence—they then recast or embellish their
overtly neutral claim with arguments about hypothetical markets and
monetary values. In the process, both the true nature of the interest at
stake and the form of harm involved get little attention or explication
by courts, who—even while finding for plaintiffs—are forced to do so in
starkly utilitarian terms.
IV. ADJUDICATING PRIVATIVE COPYRIGHT CLAIMS
As the prior discussion reveals, privative copyright claims have
fallen into disrepute in modern times due to the overt utilitarian focus
that copyright jurisprudence and scholarship have assumed. This
remains the case even though these claims have a defensibly
independent analytical and normative basis for their existence within
the copyright landscape. All the same, privative copyright claims are
hardly without their share of problems, the most obvious of which is
their ability to interfere with free speech by enabling authors to censor
publication and distribution under the garb of a dignitary interest.
Indeed, as noted previously, much of the concern with these claims
originates from the belief that the line between privative copyright
claims and censorship is a difficult one to regulate.
This Part sets out a mechanism for courts to use when
adjudicating privative copyright claims—which at once entails
recognizing the independent legitimacy of these claims and balancing

279. See id. at 1104 n.11 (citing Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 21
(S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
280. Id. at 1105.
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their underlying motivations against competing considerations. The
mechanism developed here has four interconnected components:
(1) identifying legitimate privative copyright claims, (2) adapting the
fair use defense to the nature of the interests involved in these claims,
(3) integrating a “newsworthiness” limit to such claims through fair use,
and (4) developing an appropriate remedial response for the
disseminative harm involved.
A. Sifting Through Infringement Claims
For the most part, modern copyright law does not care about a
plaintiff’s motives for commencing an infringement action, an approach
that fits with how private law areas work.281 This has obviously allowed
a plurality of considerations to influence plaintiffs in their actions and
helps account for the emergence of privative copyright claims brought
for nonpecuniary motives. All the same, there is nothing to prevent
courts from taking a closer look at the facts at issue to scrutinize a
plaintiff’s reasons for the claim and examine its fit.
A somewhat related domain where federal courts have begun an
approach along these lines within copyright litigation involves the
phenomenon of “copyright trolling”—a catch-all phrase that broadly
represents efforts by copyright plaintiffs to monetize their litigation
actions and generate an independent revenue stream through litigation
rather than through the marketplace for the work itself.282 While courts
disfavor such plaintiffs, they have routinely been at a loss for
appropriate mechanisms to rein trolling in.283 In recent times, however,
they have shown a marked openness to scrutinizing the plaintiff’s
motives for bringing the action and have exercised their discretion—
embedded within various procedural doctrines—when they deem the
motives inappropriate, then interpreting and applying copyright’s
various doctrines on the basis of such motives.284
281. See Fromer, supra note 65, at 551 (arguing that “assertions of rights with ill-fitting
motivations are sufficiently worrisome that courts ought to strongly consider weighing these
motivations before granting relief”).
282. For a general overview of copyright trolling, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy
Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 723, 746 (2013); Matthew Sag, Copyright
Trolling, an Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2015); and Matthew Sag & Jake
Haskell, Defense Against the Dark Arts of Copyright Trolling, 103 IOWA L. REV. 571, 574 (2018).
283. See Balganesh, supra note 282, at 730–31 (“[C]ourts struggle to rein in copyright trolls
and invariably resort to rules and principles that are at best indirect ways of addressing the
problem.”).
284. See, e.g., McDermott v. Monday Monday, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-09230-DLC, 2018 WL
1033240, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2018) (“Plaintiff’s counsel . . . is a known copyright
‘troll’ . . . . Thus, whether or not an attorney’s fee award could be properly awarded against the
plaintiff under Section 505, such an award against plaintiff’s counsel may be appropriate in an
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A similar approach would serve privative copyright claims well
and enable courts to address the unique nature of these claims on their
own terms. A privative copyright claim should be identifiable by three
overarching features, which a court should be able to easily discern from
the plaintiff’s filings.
First, the plaintiff bringing the action should be the putative
author or creator of the work.285 This is essential, since the interest at
the heart of these claims is a distinctively dignitary one, which is hard
to sustain with a market-based alienation or assignment. A limited
exception might be carved out for heirs, who inherit some of the
dignitary concerns of the original author, as such transfers are
distinctively noncommercial and involuntary in nature.286
Second, the work must have remained “private” at the time that
the lawsuit is brought. While this is hardly an independent category
within copyright law, it is showcased through the work being both
unpublished and unlicensed. The author should not have publicly
distributed the work, nor should she have allowed strangers to use it
indiscriminately in a manner that contradicts the existence of the
disseminative harm, which is at the core of the claim.287 All the same,
it is important to appreciate that a limited distribution to private
members—such as the intended recipient of a confidential message—is

exercise of this Court’s inherent power.”); Creazioni Artistiche Musicali, S.r.l. v. Carlin Am., Inc.,
No. 1:14-cv-09270-RJS, 2017 WL 3393850, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2017) (“Turning to Plaintiff’s
motivation in bringing suit, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was not driven by an improper
motive that would justify an award of attorney’s fees.”); Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 1:15-cv04369-AKH, 2015 WL 4092417, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2015) (“In light of [copyright troll]’s history
of abuse of court process and its failure to show ‘good cause,’ I decline to give it the benefit of an
exception to the normal rules of discovery.”); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1 through 37, No.
2:12-cv-01259-JAM-EFB, 2012 WL 2872832, at *3 n.2 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2012) (“Nothing in the
record presently suggests that plaintiff is using the court to ‘pursue an extrajudicial business plan,’
but the court notes some growing concern among district courts about these sorts of expedited
discovery matters.”).
285. This is not obvious, since copyright law allows the “legal or beneficial owner” of the
copyright to bring an action for infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2012). The term is defined to
include an exclusive license as well. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “transfer of copyright
ownership”).
286. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2012) (dealing with inheritance of copyright).
287. Contrary to what some courts have claimed, the requirement that the work be registered
with the Copyright Office as a precondition to an infringement action hardly destroys the idea that
the work must remain private. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012) (“[N]o civil action for infringement of
the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of
the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.”); New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v.
Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“In addition, our statute requires the
copyright owner to make public disclosure of his work as a precondition to protecting his copyright
interest.”). The New Era opinion cites to 17 U.S.C. § 407 (2012) as the basis for its proposition. Id.
Yet 17 U.S.C. § 407 specifically exempts “unpublished works” from its ambit. U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, CIRCULAR 7D, MANDATORY DEPOSIT OF COPIES OR PHONORECORDS FOR THE LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS 5 (2017) (“[U]npublished works . . . are not subject to this requirement.”).
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not the same as a public distribution, a difference that some courts have
failed to make.288 Thus, it is essential that the work be legally
unpublished, though not necessarily undistributed.289
Third, the work must be revelatory of the author’s identity. This
is an important requirement that gets at the root of the dignitary
interest and the idea of compelled authorship discussed previously. Yet
at the same time, it remains an open question whether this is something
that courts should scrutinize on their own, rendering the requirement
an objective one, or whether they should merely defer to the plaintiff’s
assertions on this, making it a subjective requirement. Current
privative copyright jurisprudence adopts the latter approach, which
avoids a host of subjective judgments on the part of the court for works
that fall into a grey area—for example, photographs of body parts.
Once satisfied, these three requirements would together allow
the court to classify the claim as a privative claim, which would then
enable it to apply copyright’s various other doctrines in different ways,
in the process both protecting privative claims and safeguarding
against the possibility of overreach, to which we next turn.
B. Fair Use for “Dignitary” Works
The idea that “providing economic incentives for the creation of
works . . . is not necessarily the only value which the fair use doctrine
embodies or protects”290 is hardly new. And yet, few courts have
successfully instantiated this idea into their interpretation and
application of the fair use doctrine. When Congress codified fair use in
the current copyright statute, it made clear that it intended for courts
to continue to develop the doctrine in the common law fashion, as they
had done before the codification, and that the four factors embodied in
the provision were nonexhaustive.291 Despite this, courts today take few
liberties with the four factors and feel compelled to run their analysis
through them in an almost rote manner.
The only real exception to this trend has been the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., which introduced
the idea of a “transformative use” under the first factor (the nature and

288. See Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1175 n.8 (9th Cir. 2012).
289. It is worth noting that a private—as opposed to public—distribution does not qualify as
a publication under the statute’s definition of a publication. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining
“publication”).
290. See Lish v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
291. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680 (“Beyond
a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the
courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.”).
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purpose of a defendant’s use), and thereafter allowed classification of
use under that factor to influence analysis within the others.292 In
principle, there should be no impediment to courts doing the same for
privative claims—but this time under the second factor, the nature and
character of the protected work. Already, the work’s classification as
“unpublished” remains a legitimate part of the analysis, which has
caused some conflict among courts.293 Yet, the category of unpublished
does not fully capture the interest at stake in privative claims.
A more apt category for courts to consider under the second
factor would be the “dignitary” nature of the work, a combination of its
being (1) unpublished, (2) private, and (3) embodying expression
directly implicating the author’s persona and identity. While this
classification should of course not be dispositive in the overall analysis,
it should weigh heavily and influence the interpretation and application
of the other factors. Much like with the classification of a defendant’s
use as “transformative,” the identification of a plaintiff’s work as being
of dignitary significance should inflect the court’s analysis of factor
three—the amount and substantiality of what was taken.294 The
quantity and quality of the defendant’s copying would thus come to be
assessed against the extent to which it impinges on the plaintiff’s
dignitary concerns. A small amount of copying might have serious
dignitary ramifications owing to its revelatory nature, even if it is
otherwise quantitatively insignificant in the abstract.
While the first fair use factor could be interpreted and applied
without much modification, the fourth factor, relating to the value of
the work and the market effects of the copying, should be understood as
receding in importance once the work is classified as “dignitary” in
nature. This would obviate the need for courts and litigants to identify
an artificial market for the work and speculate about the effects of the
defendant’s use on that presumptive market. Some have suggested that
courts take the provision’s use of the term “value” in the fourth fair use
factor literally and incorporate considerations of noncommercial value
into their analysis.295 Creative as this may be, it is unlikely to prove
helpful in privative claims, where the defendant’s publication will
inevitably interfere with the subjective dignitary value of the work to

292. 510 U.S. 569, 579, 586–88 (1994).
293. Compare Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985)
(noting that unpublished status tends to negate the fair use defense), with Salinger v. Random
House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[T]he 1976 Act explicitly makes all of the rights
protected by copyright, including the right of first publication, subject to the defense of fair use.”).
294. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2012) (setting out the third factor, but showing no overt connection
to the first in the text).
295. See Gilden, supra note 65, at 49.
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the author. Consequently, the fourth fair use factor is best treated as
unhelpful for privative copyright claims lest it become a factor that will
invariably favor the plaintiff.
The fair use analysis would thus effectively revolve around the
first three fair use factors. As an example of its application, consider
again the facts in Monge, where a celebrity couple had taken
photographs of their secret wedding and the Defendant magazine
somehow obtained copies of those photographs and published them in
an exposé.296 On the first factor, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
publication by the newspaper was a commercial use, which was only
marginally transformative, even though the Defendant claimed to be
engaging in the act of “news reporting.”297 This factor was found to be
neutral, at best.298 On the second factor, applying the formulation
above, a court would now examine whether the work was a dignitary
work—in being unpublished, private, and implicating the authors’
personas.299 All three of these elements were present in the photographs
at issue in Monge, in the court’s own description of the facts.300 This
factor would thus favor the Plaintiffs and now influence the analysis of
the third factor relating to the amount and substantiality of the
copying. The facts revealed that the Defendant had published “every
single photo of the wedding and almost every photo of the wedding
night.”301 The copying thus heavily implicated the dignitary component
of the works at issue insofar as it was revelatory of personal and private
details, well beyond what might have been needed for the news story.
Given the absence of a market for such dignitary works, the fourth
factor might be treated as irrelevant.
Analyzing the facts of Monge through the proposed framework
would have produced the same outcome the Ninth Circuit arrived at,
296. Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1168–70 (9th Cir. 2012).
297. Id. at 1173–74, 1176.
298. Id. at 1177.
299. An important observation about the facts in Monge is in order here. In its recitation of
the facts in the case, the court never fully considers the fact that the photographs were taken by
the employees of the chapel using the Plaintiff’s camera and at her direction, id. at 1169, 1170 n.2,
which could generate a plausible claim of authorship by the employees rather than the Plaintiff.
This was presumably irrelevant to the court because of the role that the Plaintiff played in
directing the production of the photographs, including in supplying the camera, since it is wellestablished that the author of a photograph is the person who is its “effective cause,” which need
not be the person actually taking the photograph. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,
111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884) (finding a photograph to be an original work authored by the individual
responsible for the production of the subject matter, including by arranging and posing the
subject).
300. The work was unpublished. Monge, 688 F.3d at 1177–78. It was additionally private, in
the court’s own conclusion. Id. at 1169. And lastly, the pictures clearly revealed the identity of the
authors on their very face. Id. at 1169–70.
301. Id. at 1178.
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except that the court would now overtly recognize the disseminative
harm at issue and the dignitary concerns uniquely implicated in the
works involved. The fair use framework proposed here remains
perfectly compatible with the terms of the statute and with Congress’s
intent behind it. All that remains is for courts to acknowledge that fair
use—much like copyright itself—embodies multifarious normative
ideals.
C. Newsworthiness
Privative copyright claims very often involve defendants who
seek to undo the private and unpublished nature of the work in the
name of “news,” on the assumption that the public deserves to be
informed of the content and authorship of the work involved, even if
against the wishes of the author. There is at times significant merit to
this objective, especially when the work involves matters of legitimate
public concern rather than just gossip or entertainment. To impede the
publication of such matters risks allowing privative claims to be used
as a form of censorship, potentially running afoul of the First
Amendment.
Copyright law has long been reluctant to recognize an
independent newsworthiness exception to infringement. In Harper &
Row, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the idea, especially in
relation to unpublished works, worrying that it would incentivize
defendants to “clothe” their copying in journalistic language, and at the
same time counterintuitively accord works of “greatest importance to
the public” lesser protection under the law.302 All the same, privacy
law—especially the action for public disclosure of private facts, the
closest noncopyright privative claim to privative copyright claims—has
come to recognize an independent newsworthiness defense, in the
interests of free speech.303 Both these considerations are capable of
being given substantial recognition by copyright doctrine.
Creating an independent (or per se) newsworthiness exception
is of course well beyond the prerogative of federal courts. All the same,
the idea itself is capable of being given more direct treatment within
the first fair use factor, where it is today analyzed in cursory terms at

302. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 557–59 (1985).
303. See generally Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren
and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 350–62 (1983); Geoff Dendy, Note, The
Newsworthiness Defense to the Public Disclosure Tort, 85 KY. L.J. 147, 148–49 (1996) (stating that
courts remain sensitive to infringements on the freedom of speech and consequently recognize a
broad newsworthiness defense that renders the public disclosure tort largely impotent).
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best.304 And in so doing, the analysis might benefit from the approach
adopted by courts in privacy law.
Within the domain of privacy law, the idea of newsworthiness
has moved away from being a defense that would apply automatically
once the defendant identifies its own purpose as relating to news.
Instead, courts today ask whether the content of the claimed news was
a matter of “legitimate public concern.”305 This allows the category to
keep up with changing journalistic practices as well as the “mores of the
community,” but requires courts to scrutinize the particular content at
issue to match it with the claimed newsworthiness.306 Indeed, this
approach goes some way in mitigating the concern raised in Harper &
Row, namely that a newsworthiness exception would incentivize
newspapers to clothe their copying in the garb of journalism and require
courts to scrutinize the content of the publication and the newspaper’s
real motives behind it.
The newsworthiness exception and the notion of matters having
a “legitimate public concern” have received rather expansive treatment
in the law of privacy, given that this area deals with the protection of
factual information.307 Translating it to the copyright context therefore
requires modifying it for expressive rather than factual content, given
that copyright law abjures protection for purely factual content. The
approach to newsworthiness taken by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit in the case of Núñez v. Caribbean International News
Corp. presents an important initial foray into adopting this idea.308 The
case involved the Defendant television station’s display of scantily clad
photographs of a model taken by the Plaintiff, for the purpose of asking
the audience to judge whether they were “pornographic” in nature.309
The Plaintiff was a photographer who had taken pictures of a model
304. See, e.g., Monge, 688 F.3d at 1173.
305. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (distilling this
principle and citing to cases relying on the new standard).
306. Id. cmt. g (treating news as a category within the idea of matters involving a “legitimate
public concern”).
307. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491–92 (1975) (“[I]n a society in which
each individual has but limited time and resources with which to observe at first hand the
operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in convenient
form the facts of those operations.”); Paige v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 665 F.3d 1355, 1363 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (“Paige’s FTCA claim also fails because the accidental discharge was a matter of public
concern.”); Veilleux v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92, 134 (1st Cir. 2000) (“In short, we hold that
Kennedy’s drug test results were of legitimate public concern such that defendants may not be
liable for invasion of privacy under an unreasonable publication theory.”); Shulman v. Grp. W
Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 487 (Cal. 1998) (“We agree with defendants that the publication of
truthful, lawfully obtained material of legitimate public concern is constitutionally privileged and
does not create liability under the private facts tort.”).
308. 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000).
309. Id. at 21.
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who had just recently been crowned Miss Universe Puerto Rico.310 In a
nuanced analysis, the court concluded that the nature of the
Defendant’s reporting revealed a legitimate newsworthy purpose
insofar as it was not merely for entertainment: the pictures “were
shown not just to titillate, but also to inform . . . [and] [t]his informative
function is confirmed by the newspaper’s presentation of various news
articles and interviews in conjunction with the reproduction.”311 The
court was careful to note that it was not creating a separate
newsworthiness exception.312
An appropriate way of incorporating newsworthiness into the
fair use inquiry would thus be through utilizing the first factor to
examine the extent to which the defendant’s actions represent a
genuine attempt to publish content of a legitimate public concern. The
category of legitimate public concern might be understood in similarly
expansive and contextual terms as in the law of privacy, except that it
should be understood to categorically exclude the mere attempt to
publicly attribute a work to the author-plaintiff (the essence of
compelled authorship), unless the author has publicly claimed
otherwise.313 A newspaper’s attempt to publish a celebrity’s private
wedding photographs in order to establish the fact of the marriage so
as to rebut the celebrity’s claims of being single might thus qualify as a
newsworthy use under the “legitimate public concern” standard.314 At
the same time, the newspaper’s use of the couple’s “wedding night”
photographs appear to have little content of legitimate public concern,
and thus would seem undeserving of such classification.315 Similarly, if
an individual has publicly disavowed certain views but a newspaper
obtains a letter authored by that individual and sent to some private
individuals, its publication might qualify as a newsworthy publication.
Without the disavowal, however, it would do no more than publicly force
authorship on the individual.
Without thus creating an independent newsworthiness
exception, the fair use doctrine might be adapted to incorporate the idea
under factor one. The key lies in having courts police the claim of
310. Id.
311. Id. at 22.
312. Id. (“[N]or does it establish a general ‘newsworthiness’ exception.”).
313. As a historical matter, traditional copyright principles relating to the publication of
private letters allowed the recipient to publish the letter if it was essential to refuting a false
allegation when made against the defendant. See DRONE, supra note 165, at 136–39 (“[T]he
receiver of a letter acquires in its contents a special or qualified property or right, which entitles
him to publish it for the purpose of vindicating his reputation from false charges or unjust
imputations made by the writer.”).
314. See Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1168–70, 1186–87 (9th Cir. 2012).
315. See id. at 1169–70.
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newsworthiness, as they do in privacy law, so as to ensure that the
expressive content of the work or its origins are a matter of legitimate
public concern, rather than just an effort to sensationalize or entertain.
To some this may seem problematic, insofar as it treats “the court as
the final arbiter” of newsworthiness.316 Yet, in the absence of a tailored
approach, courts will be moved in the direction of altogether
disregarding newsworthiness as a legitimate purpose.
D. Remedial Equilibration
The final—and perhaps most significant—domain where
privative copyright claims require balancing against competing
interests and considerations relates to their enforcement and the
availability of remedies. If privative copyright claims are indeed a
distinct and legitimate category of copyright infringement claims and
deserve separate recognition as such, then it is essential that
copyright’s standard remedial framework be adapted to the unique
nature of the harm that they purport to redress and the motivations
driving such claims.
It is also in the domain of remedies that courts have interpreted
the guarantees of the First Amendment to impose significant
restrictions on private law actions. While these restrictions may not
carry over to privative copyright claims as a requirement of the law,
they nevertheless provide important insights into how copyright’s
remedial framework may be adapted to ensure that privative copyright
claims do not operate as covert attempts at censorship.
Given their expurgatory motivation and the reality that
plaintiffs in privative copyright claims are principally concerned with
ensuring that the work at issue is not disseminated without their
consent, an injunction is often a remedy sought by plaintiffs. Of course,
the injunction only makes sense prior to the defendant’s dissemination
of the work, after which it becomes largely futile as a remedy, except for
further acts of dissemination by the same defendant. And rarely do
plaintiffs have advance notice of the defendant’s intended actions prior
to their commission. All the same, injunctions are often sought by
privative copyright plaintiffs either in conjunction with a claim for
damages (to prevent additional or ongoing dissemination) or when the
defendant’s actions are imminent.
In its 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, the
Supreme Court set out the standard for courts to apply in considering

316. Id. at 1188 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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the grant of injunctions.317 The case pertained to permanent
injunctions, and while it was decided within the context of the Patent
Act, it has since been extended to copyright law as well, especially since
the Court’s opinion drew from copyright jurisprudence.318 In the
opinion, the Court emphasized that in awarding injunctions, courts
were to consider and examine the applicability of each of the traditional
four equitable factors to the case before deciding on relief. These four
factors were (1) irreparable injury, (2) inadequate remedy at law, (3)
balance of hardships favoring equitable relief, and (4) the public
interest.319
The first three factors should have few problems being adapted
to the unique nature of privative copyright claims. Disseminative harm
is by its nature irreversible, and no amount of monetary relief can
substitute for the reputational and dignitary consequences of an
unauthorized distribution of the work. The remedy of damages—actual
or statutory—is thus inadequate and mismatched to the nature of the
harm at issue, and in an overwhelming majority of cases the balance of
hardships will favor the plaintiff in that the failure to grant the
injunction is likely to cause more harm to the plaintiff than would the
actual grant to the defendant. Much like in most intellectual property
cases, the first three factors are likely to favor the privative copyright
plaintiff.320 Yet, it is through the fourth equitable factor—the “public
interest”—that important considerations may enter the picture that
have hitherto not been directly considered in copyright adjudication.
The public interest prong of the test for injunctive relief has
received little focused attention from courts.321 As scholars have noted,
courts use it as a mechanism through which to affirm their decision on
the merits, and one court described the factor as little more than a “wild
card” given its lack of consistent application in the jurisprudence.322
Leaving aside courts’ (non)application of the prong in other areas, the
public interest factor is capable of being given direct validation in

317. 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
318. Id. at 392–93; see Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2010).
319. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
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Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
321. See, e.g., Gene R. Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 382, 405 (1983) (“Federal courts have lapsed into careless, sweeping language to state the
importance of statutorily based injunctions to the public interest.”); Orin H. Lewis, Note, “The Wild
Card That Is the Public Interest”: Putting a New Face on the Fourth Preliminary Injunction Factor,
72 TEX. L. REV. 849, 850–52 (1994) (“The public interest doesn’t get much respect. As one of the
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weight’ in ‘the vast majority of cases’ . . . .”).
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70

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1:1

privative copyright claims. Indeed, the lack of a coherent jurisprudence
for this factor suggests that courts adjudicating privative copyright
claims might be able to exercise their equitable discretion in this area
with few problems.
Copyright jurisprudence has resisted the creation of an
independent newsworthiness defense to infringement, and for good
reason. Yet, newsworthiness as understood today in terms of legitimate
public interest remains a perfect idea for courts to instantiate at the
remedial level in determining whether to issue an injunction and enjoin
the defendant’s actions. A court could determine that the defendant’s
actions serve the broader public interest because of the nature of the
content being disseminated—for instance, when it involves matters of
contemporary political relevance, such as the correspondence of
someone running for political office. While a court should of course not
give that fact dispositive consideration in the fair use analysis, it should
be able to do so when considering the plaintiff’s request for an
injunction.
Requiring courts to exercise their equitable discretion in a
manner commensurate with the nature of the interest at issue is in
keeping with how courts of equity have long approached their task.323
As is well known, equity historically forbade courts from issuing
injunctions against defamatory speech, a rule that has come to be
relaxed only in recent times.324 Resurrecting the public interest prong
and repurposing it toward collectivist considerations underlying the
content at issue would thus be in keeping with this long equitable
tradition. But perhaps more importantly, it would serve the important
role of introducing a direct mechanism for First Amendment and free
speech concerns to be weighed against privative claims during their
enforcement.
CONCLUSION
Normative purity is indeed an attractive ideal in the law, and
one that modern copyright thinking and scholarship have all too
willingly gravitated toward. Justified by the seemingly utilitarian
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REV. 1, 18 (2013) (“The no-injunction rule [in defamation cases] has been a fixture of AngloAmerican law for more than three centuries.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Injunctions in Defamation
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phrasing of the Constitution as well as the influence of neoclassical
economic thinking, modern U.S. copyright law has come to be
shoehorned into a theory of creator incentives, according to which
copyright exists exclusively to function as a market-based incentive for
creativity. In its quest for theoretical coherence, this view of copyright
law has all too readily ignored the important noneconomic ideals that
the institution of copyright has enshrined since its origins.
Despite recurrent efforts to move them into the domain of
privacy law, privative copyright claims have remained a staple of the
Anglo-American copyright landscape. Built on considerations of
autonomy and dignity, as they relate to authorship, privative copyright
claims today present courts with a unique set of challenges. All of these
challenges, rather ironically, derive from courts’ unwillingness to
recognize the distinctive nature of these claims and their role within
the overall copyright landscape. But the problem is hardly
insurmountable. All that it requires is a basic open-mindedness about
copyright’s normative commitments and a recognition that in this
domain, copyright law can learn from the functioning of other types of
privative claims, which have succeeded in balancing the plaintiff’s
private interests against censorship concerns emanating from the First
Amendment.
Copyright has always been an institution that has affirmed a
plurality of normative values, and the persistence of privative copyright
claims confirms this reality. Courts and scholars might find this messy,
complex, and theoretically inelegant. Yet it represents the story of
copyright’s evolution, which is hard to ignore or erase. Theoretical
coherence in the law, while desirable in the abstract, is often at the cost
of practical reality and experience. Justice Holmes famously noted that
“to know what [the law] is, we must know what it has been, and what
it tends to become.”325 Here, as elsewhere, copyright law would do well
to look to its growth and evolution over time, which together reveal that
its life has been much more about pragmatism than logic.
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